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The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

David J. Cooper  and
E. Glenn Dutcher
David J. Cooper*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA
E. Glenn Dutcher
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA
*
e-mail: djcooper@fsu.edu
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Abstract

Using data aggregated from seven papers that study repeated play in standard ultimatum games with either stranger or absolute stranger matching, we show that the behavior of responders changes with experience. High offers are more likely to be accepted with experience and low offers are more likely to be rejected. At the individual level, there is a negative relationship between the likelihood that a given offer is accepted and the size of the preceding offer. We compare the results with predictions generated by static models of distributional preferences, implicitly dynamic models of preferences with reciprocity, and explicitly dynamic models of adaptive learning. The data is most consistent with models of preferences with reciprocity.

Keywords

Ultimatum gamesOther-regarding preferencesLearning

JEL classification

C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 2011 , pp. 519 - 546
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 Economic Science Association

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