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EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, EPISTEMIC PREEMPTION, AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Sarah Wright
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Abstract

How does the intellectually virtuous person respond to the beliefs of those whom they judge to be their epistemic superiors? Linda Zagzebski argues that we ought to take the beliefs of those we judge to be our epistemic authorities as a preemptive reason to believe the same. Zagzebski's argument for this preemption is intended to be an extension of Joseph Raz's argument for political authority. After exploring Zagzebski's specific formulation of epistemic preemption, I argue that epistemic authority is significantly different from political authority; hence Raz's arguments cannot be extended to the epistemic case. Further, I demonstrate that a virtue epistemic perspective will recommend against epistemic preemption. Such preemption brings about a problematic closed-mindedness to ourselves and is an extreme reaction more suited to epistemic vice than to epistemic virtue.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 555 - 570
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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