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DOING (BETTER) WHAT COMES NATURALLY: ZAGZEBSKI ON RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC SELF-TRUST

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 September 2015

Elizabeth Fricker
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Abstract

I offer an account of what trust is, and of what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify five distinct arguments extracted from Chapter 2 of Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority for the rationality and epistemic legitimacy of epistemic self-trust. I take issue with the general account of human rational self-regulation on which one of her arguments rests. Zagzebski maintains that this consists in restoring harmony in the psyche by eliminating conflict and so ending ‘dissonance’. I argue that epistemic rationality is distinct from psychic mechanisms aimed at eliminating dissonance, and these two sometimes pull in opposed directions.

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Type
Symposium: Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , June 2016 , pp. 151 - 166
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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