Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-mnl9s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-09-06T05:27:19.074Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Conceptions of Epistemic Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2021

Timothy Perrine Open the ORCID record for Timothy Perrine [Opens in a new window]
Timothy Perrine*
Affiliation:
Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
*
Email: timperrine@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity.

Keywords

Epistemic valuefinal valueFormal ConceptionHybrid ConceptionSimpliciter Conception

Information

Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 213 - 231
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Adams, R. (1999). Finite and Infinite Goods. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013 a). ‘In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94(1), 19–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013 b). ‘Meno and the Monist.’ Metaphilosophy 44, 1–2.10.1111/meta.12022CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alston, W. (1996). A Realist Conception of Truth. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Aristotle (n.d.) Nicomachean Ethics (NE). Many editions and translations.Google Scholar
Aristotle (n.d.) Eudemian Ethics (EE). Many editions and translations.Google Scholar
Baker, D. (2018). ‘Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter.’ In Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 13, pp. 230–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bedke, M. (2010). ‘Might All Normativity be Queer?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(1), 41–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Case, S. (2016). ‘Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False.’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11(1), 1–19.10.26556/jesp.v11i1.107CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Case, S. (2019). ‘From Epistemic to Moral Realism.’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 16(5), 541–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, T. (2014). The Aim of Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. (1991). ‘Firth and the Ethics of Belief.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(1), 119–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Copp, D. (2007). Morality in a Natural World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowie, C. (2014). ‘Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work.’ Philosophical Quarterly 64(256), 407–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cowie, C. (2016). ‘Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1), 115–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cuneo, T. (2007). The Normative Web. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cuneo, T and Kyriacou, C. (2018). ‘Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity.’ In McHugh, C., Way, J. and Whiting, D. (eds), Metaepistemology, pp. 28–45. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Das, R. (2016). ‘Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Still Work: A Reply to Cowie.’ Philosophical Quarterly 66(262), 152–61.Google Scholar
Das, R. (2017). ‘Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1), 58–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorsey, D. (2013). ‘Two Dualism of Practical Reason.’ In Shafer-Landau, R. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 114–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Enoch, D. (2006). ‘Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What Is Constitutive of Action.’ Philosophical Review 115(2), 169–98.10.1215/00318108-2005-014CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Enoch, D. (2011). ‘Shmagency Revisited.’ In New Waves in Metaethics, pp. 208–33. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Feldman, R. (2002). ‘Epistemological Duties.’ In Moser, P. (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, pp. 363–83. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ferrero, L. (2009). ‘Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.’ In Shafer-Landau, R. (eds), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 4, pp. 303–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Flowerree, A.K. (2018). ‘Epistemic Schmagency?’ In Metaepistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Frankena, W. (1973). Ethics, 2nd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Geach, P.T. (1956). ‘Good and Evil.’ Analysis 17(2), 33–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. (1991). Review of Stich's The Fragmentation of Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(1), 189–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. and Olsson, E. (2009). ‘Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.’ In Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. (eds), The Value of Knowledge, pp. 19–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Katsafanas, P. (2013). Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Korsgaard, C. (2009). Self Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kraut, R. (2011). Against Absolute Goodness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lynch, M. (2004). True to Life. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J.L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin.Google Scholar
Matheson, D. (2011). ‘How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist.’ Dialogue 50(1), 391–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McHugh, C. (2012). ‘The Truth Norm of Belief.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93, 8–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLeod, O. (2001). ‘Just Plain ‘Ought.’ Journal of Ethics 5(4), 269–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oliveira, L.R.G. (2017). ‘Deontological Evidentialism, Wide-Scope, and Privileged Values.’ Philosophical Studies 174(2), 485–506.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, J. (2018). ‘Moral and Epistemic Error Theory.’ In McHugh, C., Way, J. and Whiting, D. (eds), Metaepistemology, 107–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perrine, T. (2017). Epistemic Value and Accurate Representation. PhD Dissertation, Indiana University.Google Scholar
Perrine, T. (2018). ‘Basic Final Value and Zimmerman's The Nature of Intrinsic Value.’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(4), 979–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perrine, T. (2020). ‘On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.’ Logos & Episteme 11(1), 77–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. (2010). ‘Knowledge and Understanding.’ In Pritchard, D., Millar, A. and Haddock, A. (eds), The Nature and Value of Knowledge, pp. 3–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. (2014). ‘Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good.’ In Matheson, J. and Vitz, R. (eds), The Ethics of Belief, pp. 110–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. (1969). ‘Natural Kinds.’ In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp. 114–38. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Railton, P. (2003). ‘On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action.’ In Facts and Value, pp. 293–321. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Resnik, D. (1994). ‘Epistemic Value: Truth or Explanation?’ Metaphilosophy 25(4), 348–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ridge, M. (2013). ‘Getting Lost on the Road to Larissa.’ Noûs 47(1), 181–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ross, W.D. (1939). The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Rowland, R. (2013). ‘Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic Reasons.’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7(1), 1–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowland, R. (2016). ‘Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments.’ Philosophical Quarterly 66(262), 161–71.Google Scholar
Sagdahl, M.S. (2014). ‘The Argument from Nominal-Notable Comparisons, ‘Ought All Things Considered,’ and Normative Pluralism.’ Journal of Ethics 18, 405–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shah, N. (2003). ‘How Truth Governs Belief.’ Philosophical Review 112(4), 447–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shah, N and Velleman, J.D. (2005). ‘Doxastic Deliberation.’ Philosophical Review 114(4), 497–534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Silverstein, M. (2015). ‘The Shmagency Question.’ Philosophical Studies 172, 1127–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skorupski, J. (2010). The Domain of Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stich, S. (1990). The Fragmentation of Reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Sylvan, K. (2018). ‘Veritism Unswamped.’ Mind 127(506), 381–435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomson, J.J. (2008). Normativity. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Tiffany, E. (2007). ‘Deflationary Normative Pluralism.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37(1), 231–62.Google Scholar
Velleman, J.D. (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of The Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zimmerman, M. (2001). The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar