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Tacit Knowing: What it is and Why it Matters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2021

Abida Malik Open the ORCID record for Abida Malik [Opens in a new window]
Abida Malik*
Affiliation:
Department of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, School of Sciences and Humanities, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan
*
Email: abida_malik@yahoo.de
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Abstract

Tacit knowing as a concept and legitimate topic of scholarship came up in philosophical research in the second half of the 20th century in the form of some influential works by Michael Polanyi (although similar concepts had been discussed before). Systematic epistemological studies on the topic are still scarce, however. In this article, I support the thesis that tacit knowing pervades all our common major divisions of knowledge and that it therefore must not be neglected in epistemological research. By this approach I am simultaneously giving a systematic back-up for Polanyi's claim that the tacit component is found in all knowledge.

Keywords

Tacit knowingMichael Polanyiknowledgeknowledge divisionsexpertiseabilities

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Article
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Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 349 - 366
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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