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REGULARITY REFORMULATED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2012

Weng Hong Tang
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the view that rationality requires that our credences be regular. I go through different formulations of the requirement, and show that they face several problems. I then formulate a version of the requirement that solves most of, if not all, these problems. I conclude by showing that an argument thought to support the requirement as traditionally formulated actually does not; if anything, the argument, slightly modified, supports my version of the requirement.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 329 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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