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PROPOSITIONAL LEARNING: FROM IGNORANCE TO KNOWLEDGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2018

Pierre Le Morvan
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Abstract

In this paper, I offer an account of propositional learning: namely, learning that p. I argue for what I call the “Three Transitions Thesis” or “TTT” according to which four states and three transitions between them characterize such learning. I later supplement the TTT to account for learning why p. In making my case, I discuss mathematical propositions such as Fermat's Last Theorem and the ABC Conjecture, and then generalize to other mathematical propositions and to non-mathematical propositions. I also discuss some interesting applications of the TTT, and reply to some noteworthy objections.

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Episteme , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 162 - 177
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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