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Managing multiple fishery pools: property rights regimes and marketstructures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 September 2008

ALEX HALSEMA  and
CEES WITHAGEN
ALEX HALSEMA
Affiliation:
Department of Spatial Economics, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: ahalsema@feweb.vu.nl
CEES WITHAGEN
Affiliation:
Department of Spatial Economics, VU University Amsterdam and Department of Economics, Tilburg University
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Abstract

Well-defined and enforceable property rights are usually seen as a prerequisitefor optimal resource management. However, the interaction effects betweendifferent renewable resource pools with different ownership structures are oftennot well recognized. In this paper we introduce these interaction effects inoptimal fishery management theory. Various property rights regimes and marketstructures for fisheries are analyzed. Furthermore, we perform a sensitivityanalysis with respect to the carrying capacity of a fish lake for the differentagents. We describe various approach paths towards the new equilibrium afteropening up to a common market. We show that a decline in market power leads to alower stock and a higher supply. Furthermore we identify conditions under whichmarket power might reduce profits.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 13 , Issue 6: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT , December 2008 , pp. 775 - 794
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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