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TO PROFIT MAXIMIZE, OR NOT TO PROFIT MAXIMIZE: FOR FIRMS, THIS IS A VALID QUESTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2018

Gregory Robson
Gregory Robson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 213 Social Sciences Building, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA. Email: grobson@email.arizona.edu. URL: https://philosophy.arizona.edu/user/greg-robson
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Abstract:

According to an influential argument in business ethics and economics, firms are normatively required to maximize their contributions to social welfare, and the way to do this is to maximize their profits. Against Michael Jensen's version of the argument, I argue that even if firms are required to maximize their social welfare contributions, they are not necessarily required to maximize their profits. I also consider and reply to Waheed Hussain's ‘personal sphere’ critique of Jensen. My distinct challenge to Jensen seems to me fatal to any view according to which firms are normatively required to maximize their profits.

Keywords

ProfitThe FirmMichael JensenWaheed Hussain

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Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , July 2019 , pp. 307 - 320
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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