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On the Lexical Ordering of Social States According To Rawls' Principles of Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Juan Hersztajn Moldau
Juan Hersztajn Moldau
Affiliation:
University of Sao Paulo
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Extract

This article is concerned with the selection of an appropriate model of choice to underlie Rawls' (1971) two principles of justice. Rawls' first principle of justice states that basic liberty is not to be sacrificed for other objectives, including wealth. His second principle of justice suggests that even a minute decrease in the well-being of the least prosperous classes should not be accepted in exchange for an increase, no matter how large, in the well-being of more well-to-do citizens.

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Type
Essays
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , April 1992 , pp. 141 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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