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ENTITLEMENT THEORY OF JUSTICE AND END-STATE FAIRNESS IN THE ALLOCATION OF GOODS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2017

Biung-Ghi Ju  and
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
Biung-Ghi Ju
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 08826, Korea. Email: bgju@snu.ac.kr. URL: http://cdj.snu.ac.kr.
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain.
*
Address for correspondence: Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, Carretera de Utrera, Km. 1. 41013, Seville, Spain; Email: jdmoreno@upo.es; URL: https://sites.google.com/site/jmorenoternero/.
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Abstract:

Robert Nozick allegedly introduced his liberal theory of private ownership as an objection to theories of end-state justice. Nevertheless, we show that, in a stylized framework for the allocation of goods in joint ventures, both approaches can be seen as complementary. More precisely, in such a context, self-ownership (the basis for Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice) followed by voluntary transfer (Nozick’s principle of just transfer) can lead to end-state fairness (as well as Pareto efficiency). Furthermore, under a certain solidarity condition, the only way to achieve end-state fairness, following Nozick’s procedure, is to endorse an egalitarian rule for the initial assignment of rights.

Keywords

Entitlement theory of justiceEnd-state fairnessSelf-ownershipFairnessNo-envy
Type
Symposium Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 34 , Special Issue 3: Exploitation , November 2018 , pp. 317 - 341
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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