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CONCERNS FOR THE POORLY OFF IN ORDERING RISKY PROSPECTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Luc Bovens
Luc Bovens*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Houghton Street, London WC2A2AE, UK. Email: L.Bovens@LSE.ac.uk. URL: http://www.bovens.org
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Abstract:

The Distribution View provides a model that integrates four distributional concerns in the evaluation of risky prospects. Starting from these concerns, we can generate an ordering over a set of risky prospects, or, starting from an ordering, we can extract a characterization of the underlying distributional concerns. Separability of States and/or Persons for multiple-person risky prospects, for single-person risky prospects and for multiple-person certain prospects are discussed within the model. The Distribution View sheds light on public health policies and provides a framework for the discussion of Parfit's Priority View for risky prospects.

Keywords

Prioritarianismriskprospectsseparabilityequally-distributed-equivalent

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Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , November 2015 , pp. 397 - 429
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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