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CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

Greg Bognar Open the ORCID record for Greg Bognar [Opens in a new window]
Greg Bognar*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Stockholm 10691, Sweden. Email: greg.bognar@philosophy.su.se. URL: http://gregbognar.net.
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Abstract:

The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Keywords

luck egalitarianismbrute luckoption luckneutrality objectionequality of opportunity

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Type
Article
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , July 2019 , pp. 259 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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