Peu de passages de l'oeuvre de Wittgenstein ont suscité autant de commentaires et de discussions que les paragraphes des Recherches philosophiques dans lesquels il presénte ce que l'on a appele« ; l'argumentdu langage privé »;. Wittgenstein definit un langage prive comme un langage dont les mots sont censés se referer« ; á ce dont seul celui qui parle peut avoir connaissance; a ses sensations immediates et privées »; (243).' Il s'agit de montrer, par cet argument, Timpossibilite d'un langage comme celui-ci. Une difficulte importante que pose l'interpretation de ces textes est la suivante. D'une part, pour Wittgenstein, il ne peut y avoir de reference (linguistique) a une experience interne, peu importe l'experience, si seul le locuteur peut savoir de quoi il parle, c'est-a-dire si sa sensation est privee. Le langage imagine est done impossible. D'autre part, pour la plupart des commentateurs des Recherches, il soutient egalement que toutes les sensations sont des experiences privees. II s'ensuit la consequence paradoxale que les mots du langage usuel par lesquels nous nous referons (ou croyons nous referer) a des sensations ne s'y referent pas reellement. Le mot« ; douleur »;, par exemple, ne denomme pas une sensation au sens ou on dit, de facon tout a fait correcte, que le mot« ; rouge »; denomme une certaine couleur.

Imagine this sequence of events. I am at the wheel of my car at an intersection, waiting for the lights to change. Suddenly, a stranger runs out of the bank building at the corner, makes his way into the car, puts a gun to my head and orders me to drive off, on the double. Eventually there's a chase and we are caught.

In some of his last publications, R. G. Collingwood takes the position that problems in philosophy are not eternal. Such a denial, in the context of the controversies concerning the overall interpretation of Collingwood's work, is significant for at least two reasons: it seems to suggest an “atomistic” view of the history of philosophy on Collingwood's part, perhaps one that resembles that of the history of science as offered in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Also, the denial seems to reverse Collingwood's earlier views which insisted on a philosophia perennis, and this would support those who maintain that at some point Collingwood's thought underwent a “radical conversion”.

Une théorie davidsonienne de la signification pour une langue L prend la forme d'une theorie tarskienne (réecursive et vraie) de la véeritée-dans-L. Une telle théeorie sera absolument radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne, c'est-à-dire conforme à la convention T de Tarski (1931), en n'utilisant que des donnéees empiriques dont la description ne fait intervenir aucun concept linguistique (tels que ceux de synonymie, d'analyticitée, de signification, etc.), tandis qu'elle sera relativement radicale s'il est possible d'éetablir qu'elle est tarskienne en n'utilisant que des donnéees empiriques dont la description ne fait intervenir aucun concept linguistique propre à L (tels que ceux de synonymie-dans-L, d'analyticitée-dans-L, etc.).

In §6 of Book 1, Part 4 of the Treatise, Hume appears to be inconsistent in his comments about ascriptions of identity to series of successive, significantly related items or to purported single things whose temporal stages are qualitatively different or temporally discontinuous. For example, in the first few pages of §6, Hume explicitly labels such ascriptions “mistakes” and “confusions” (THN, 1. 4. §6, 253–254). Later on in the same section, however, he deals with the alleged identity-preservation of minds, churches, rivers, and so forth and no longer remarks that these attributions of identity are confused or mistaken. Hume claims that the idea of identity is the idea of an item which is (1) invariable, i.e., serially uniform, and (2) uninterrupted, i.e., temporally continuous, which seems to last through time (THN, 1. 4. §2, 200–201; 1. 4. §6, 253). Thus, on page 255 he states that “identity” is used “in an improper sense” if attributed to a series of related items which are either different in kind or temporally discontinuous, viz., to a purported identity-preserving thing whose temporal stages are different in kind or temporally discontinuous. Yet, on page 258, he comments that calling a church which has been rebuilt of different materials and in a different architectural style the same church as the former one can be done “without breach of the propriety of language”. Presumably, this use of “same” is a proper sense of “same”.

My purpose in this paper is to investigate the ontological structure of the theory that Plato ascribes to Protagoras in the Theaetetus (152–160). My interest is not just historical—what I wish to do is to explore the contemporary significance of Plato's Protagorean thesis, especially with regard to the theory of truth and the theory of perception. Even so, I shall attempt to say quite a lot about the text—I think that certain recent interpreters (especially M. F. Burnyeat [1982]) are on the wrong track with regard to Protagorean relativism, precisely due to their misjudging the relation of the Theaetetus doctrine to more recent philosophy.

A stranger runs out of a bank while I am sitting at the wheel of my car waiting for the lights to change; he jumps in beside me, points a gun at me, and says, “Drive me to St. Bruno.” This is Andre Gombay's example, from his excellent paper on duress. The question that interests Gombay and me is: Could I refrain from doing what the gunman asks?

On s'émerveille souvent devant l'envergure de la méthode et de l'érudition de Max Weber. On rappelle fréquemment que, dans l'oeuvre de celui-ci, d'étroites relations existent entre les différentes composantes. On cherche trop peu à montrer comment ce savoir se fait encyclo-pédique et quelle est la nature de ce rapport entre les parties. Nombreux sont les ouvrages (ordinairement fidèles et utiles) qui affirment l'interdépendance des constituantes de la pensée wébérienne mais qui, néanmoins, en extraient quelque fragment (à des fins souvent justifiables et éclairantes) ou la divisent en morceaux—les juxtaposant sans jamais pouvoir vraiment les ressouder les uns aux autres—quasiment toujours en reprenant le découpage de Weber lui-même. On aperçoit bien les diverses branches de la réflexion wébérienne; on réalise qu'elles ont un tronc commun; on descend rarement jusqu'à la racine. Dans ces profondeurs, on découvre que la théorie verstehen doit ses réalisations à une conception d'une simplicité exagérée de la rationalité grâce à laquelle la raison s'allonge démesurément.

Je n'examinerai, au cours de cet article, que I'un des aspects du matérialisme de Diderot: la physionomie du théoricien de la nature, de l'auteur de I' Interprétation de la Nature (1753), du Rêve de d'Alembert (1769). Ces oeuvres versent au dossier du développement de la philosophie des sciences de la nature, une doctrine, le materialisme; une methodologie; un programme de recherche. Mais sur ce sujet on ne peut guere separer la réflexion de Diderot de celle de son ami d'Holbach, réflexion qui lui est complementaire. D'Holbach rencontre les thèses de Diderot et surtout les systématisent. L'enjeu principal de cette systématisation est la diffusion des idées et du programme du « parti des philosophes ». Il s'agit de mettre à la disposition du combat encyclopediste le nouveau Discours de la méthode des sciences expérimentales, sous forme manipulable d'un code, le Code de la Nature. « Système de la Nature », l'expression empruntee au titre de l'ouvrage célèbre du baron, paru en 1779, manifeste cette intention polémique/politique. D'Holbach nomme ainsi son ouvrage, même si à cette époque on entend par opposition au mathematisme cartésien, s'entenir, contre tout système, à l'expérience, à la leçon des faits.

The disagreement between André Gombay and Storrs McCall can be summed up in terms of the distinction between liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference. This distinction is actually used by Professor McCall in his paper. Thus, it would seem that both speakers agree that a person acting under duress cannot exercise liberty of spontaneity—he (or she) does not act according to his (or her) wishes. However, Gombay also claims, at least according to McCall, that liberty of indifference is also lacking in cases of duress—persons under duress have no other choice than to obey when threatened. McCall takes an opposite view. He thinks that the only genuine cases of compulsion belong either to various types of physical coercion or to a certain number of pathologies of the mind.

In discussing the relation between miracles and the laws of nature, it is important to make clear what one means when one employs the terms “miracle” and “law of nature”. This is essential, since both terms may be used in a number of different ways. I wish to begin, therefore, by briefly indicating how I shall use these terms. I shall then be in a position t o discuss the relation between these particular concepts of miracles and the laws of nature.

La connaissance est traditionnellement envisagée comme un processus mettant en rapport un sujet et un objet. Le processus peut être doublement orienté selon que l'on considère la réception de l'information par l e sujet, ou la représentation de l'objet qui peut avoir différentes modalités, parmi lesquelles je compte l'assertion de quelque chose quant à l'objet. Je schématise ces deux orientations de la façon suivante:

(1) I (O,S) = K1

(2) R (S,O) = K2

Prendre connaissance d'un manuel de mathématiques, être ébloui par une lumière vive, n'est pas identique à résoudre un problème de mathématiques, ou à savoir que la voiture qui vient en face n'a pas mis ses feux de croisement. Il y a bien lieu de distinguer deux types de connaissances: K1 et K2; je ne me préoccuperai pas de la question générale de l'identité des éléments de chacune et j'utiliserai les mêmes symboles S et O.

Andre Gombay gives a penetrating, accurate account of the functioning of duress as a defence in current Canadian law, and puts forward an intelligent and very appealing suggestion as to how the law on duress might be reformed. As part of the underpinnings for his reform proposals, he attempts to unravel the elements of justification and excuse that intertwine in duress and provides his analysis of how duress is distinguishable from other excuses or defences. I agree with him that the present working conception of duress in law falls far short of its appropriate moral potential as a defence, and I wish in these comments to support his proposals for reform. However, I think his arguments regarding the nature of duress, and its bearing on our responsibility for what we do under duress, are less persuasive, and it is here that I will begin.

Un monde nouveau apparaît avec la dialectique platonicienne, qui brise l'harmonie native de la pensée archaïque et sa rayonnante unité, pour opposer désormais le royaume invisible des Formes dont lâme conserve, en une tonalité mineure, la nostalgie, et le troublant exil des corps, livrés aux désirs ehatoyants des simulacres. Issue d'une disso-nance aussi radicale, la philosophie s'épuisera au cours de son histoire à tenter de combler le χωρισμóς pour se résoudre en un accord parfait. Cette interprétation communément reçue du platonisme, qui prédispose à l'idéalisme comme au christianisme, commande encore les lectures critiques de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, mais tient déjà tout entière dans la fresque de Raphaël: représenté près d'Aristote dont la main, largement ouverte, impose sa maîtrise à la terre, l'auteur du Timée montre, d'un doigt impératif, la direction du ciel.

In 1972, one of Michelangelo's earliest and best-known Pietàs was attacked by an evident lunatic. Fifteen times it was struck with a ninepound hammer; the Madonna's arm was broken in several places, her nose was knocked off, and her eye and veil were badly chipped. Immediately after the assault, and before knowing precisely what was needed to be replaced, the Director of the Vatican Museum, Redig de Campos, decided that integral restoration was called for.

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.

The Editor has very kindly offered me a last word; and I avail myself of the offer not so much to defend, improve or retract what I wrote a year ago as to acquaint the readers of Dialogue with a legal development that has occurred since then. That is a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the so-called Perka case.

Le dernier ouvrage d'Yvon Gauthier, son quatrième, n'est certes pas d'une lecture des plus faciles. Le bon lecteur devrait à la fois être familier du formalisme de la mécanique quantique et des labyrinthes lacaniens, connaître la théorie des modéles êt etre revenu de Heidegger.

Tout cela rend la tâche d'un critique de Gauthier ardue et périlleuse; aussi je prierai le lecteur (le mien) de m'excuser à l'avance si, dans le foisonnement philosophique de l'ouvrage, j'ai dû restreindre mon attention à certains aspects particuliers.

In common with most, if not all, commentato?s on Hume's Treatise, Book 1, Part 4, §2, “Of scepticism with regard to the senses”, I consider his reasoning in places to be unsound and his claims to be inconsistent. In that section Hume is conce?ned with the question of how we come to believe in the existence of material objects having a continuous existence independently of ou? perceiving them. Since, in his more tough-minded moments, he takes it that the only perceptual data with which we can ever have acquaintance consists of fleeting impressions which are dependent on our having them, he f?nds himself led to the bleak and implausible conclusion that the existence of material objects is a fiction, and the belief something into which we are seduced by the imagination.

Basic to Richard Wollheim's theory of art in Art and Its Objects is the proposition that “art is, in Wittgenstein's sense, a form of life”. This sense of the expression “a form of life” (“ein Lebensform”) is elusive; Wittgenstein uses it only a few times in his Investigations, leaving such mysteries as how to interpret the famous gnomicism, “What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life.” Wollheim's way of dispelling some of the mystery is to draw two fairly sharp implications from the thought that art is a form of life. It implies that artistic social institutions neither dominate artists in virtue of the stuffs and processes that they sanction and accredit, nor suffer them to work within languages or media which are arbitrary. I will be denying both implications.