¹ On the dates of Polybius’ life and works, see J.-L. Ferrary, ‘Le jugement de Polybe sur la domination romaine: état de la question’, in J.S. Yanguas and E. Torregaray (edd.), Polibio e la peninsula ibérica (Vitoria, 2003), 15–32; J.-L. Ferrary, Philhellénisme et impérialisme: aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate (Paris, 2014), 721–3.

² Polyb. 1.1.5. All translations are my own.

³ C.B. Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’ Histories (Berkeley, 2004), 83 n. 50; C.B. Champion, ‘Polybius on political constitutions, interstate relations, and imperial expansion’, in H. Beck (ed.), A Companion to Ancient Greek Government (Malden, MA / Oxford / Chichester, 2013), 119–30.

⁴ Polyb. 6.47.1–6. On πολιτϵία in general, see J. Bordes, Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu’à Aristote (Paris, 1982). On πολιτϵία in Polybius, see M.-R. Guelfucci, ‘Pouvoir politique et crise de société chez Polybe’, in S. Franchet d’Espèrey, V. Fromentin, S. Gotteland and J.-M. Roddaz (edd.), Fondements et crises du pouvoir (Paris and Bordeaux, 2003), 271–80; Champion (n. 3 [2004]), 75.

⁵ Polybius never uses the phrase μικτὴ πολιτϵία; he rather uses terms indicating a balance of weights (ἀντισπῶ, ἰσορροπῶ at 6.10.7). See B. Straumann, ‘Leaving the state of nature: Polybius on resentment and the emergence of morals and political order’, Polis 37 (2020), 9–43, at 32.

⁶ As Straumann (n. 5) forcefully argues, the value of the balanced regime in Polybius’ eyes is that it makes minimal demands on individual virtue. One could say that it economizes on virtue (I owe this useful formulation to the anonymous reviewer), but it does not make it irrelevant or useless: ceteris paribus, better a competent and honest ruler than a scoundrel. And if regime degeneration goes through individual vice—as we will see that there are reasons to think, including in the case of the balanced regime—there is no a priori reason for denying that individual virtue might help put it off. Scipio Aemilianus, who started his career at a time when moral degeneration had already sunk in at Rome (Polyb. 31.25.1–8), did manage to add to the city’s res gestae. When, at 6.43.5–6.44.1, Polybius seems to downplay the importance of virtue in politics, he actually contrasts the Roman constitution’s capacity to develop virtue (like πίστις, for instance Polyb. 6.56.13–15) at large with Thebes’ or Athens’ dependence, for their successes, on the exceptional virtues of prominent individuals.

⁷ On the meaning of δημοκρατία in Polybius, see D. Musti, ‘Polibio e la democrazia’, ASNP 36 (1967), 155–207; C. Nicolet, ‘Polybe et la “constitution” de Rome: aristocratie et démocratie’, in C. Nicolet (ed.), Demokratia et Aristokratia. A propos de Caius Gracchus: mots grecs et réalités romaines (Paris, 1983), 15–35, at 23–4; F.W. Walbank, ‘Polybius’ perception of the one and the many’, in I. Malkin and Z.W. Rubinsohn (edd.), Leaders and Masses in the Roman World: Studies in Honor of Zvi Yavetz (Leiden / New York / Cologne, 1995), 201–22, at 202–3; P.A. Tuci, ‘La democrazia di Polibio tra eredità classica e federalismo’, in C. Bearzot, F. Landucci, G. Zecchini (edd.), Gli stati territoriali nel mondo antico (Milan, 2003), 45–86; L. Polverini, ‘Democrazia a Roma? La costituzione repubblicana secondo Polibio’, in G. Urso (ed.), Popolo e potere nel mondo antico (Pisa, 2005), 85–96, at 95. The consensus that has emerged is that the term sometimes designates a regime free from domination by an external power or from a tyrant (in which sense it can include oligarchy), but that Polybius also uses it in the more strictly political sense of ‘government by the people’. Musti (this note), 189–90 helpfully insists on Polybius’ attachment to democracy: the balanced regime is not reproducible everywhere and, when a regime is democratic (like the Achaean Confederation), a good statesman’s role is to prevent it against its ‘connatural flaws’, in that case ochlocracy. See also K.-W. Welwei, ‘Demokratie und Masse bei Polybios’, Historia 15 (1966), 282–301, at 282–3; E. Braun, ‘Die extreme Demokratie bei Aristoteles und Polybios’, Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Institutes in Wien 54 (1983), 1–40, at 31.

⁸ Against K.-E. Petzold, Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung (Munich, 1969), 31 n. 2, I take it that Polybius is here talking of the political organization of both the Confederation and the cities. Cf. Nicolet (n. 7), 26 n. 29: ‘les mots de Polybe insistent non seulement sur l’égalité devant la loi, mais sur l’égalité et la liberté réelles dans la fonction délibérative’. In Polybius, it is a democratic trait that the people have a share in deliberation (6.14.10–11, 6.57.8). There seems to have been no property qualification to participation in the Achaean assembly: Nicolet (n. 7), 29–30.

⁹ Polyb. 3.118.12: the Histories aim at helping the statesman in the reform (διόρθωσις) of regimes—presumably, beyond the balanced regime.

¹⁰ Some studies on Polybius’ political theory mention ἰσηγορία and παρρησία but without focussing on their workings: H. Ryffel, Μϵταβολὴ πολιτϵιῶν. Der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen (New York, 1949), 185 n. 345; T. Cole, ‘The sources and composition of Polybius VI’, Historia 13 (1964), 440–86, at 461–2; P. Pédech, La méthode historique de Polybe (Paris, 1964), 304 n. 8; Welwei (n. 7), 283 n. 5, 290; Musti (n. 7), 193–4; P. Pédech, ‘Polybe face à la crise romaine de son temps’, in Actes du IXe Congrès de l’Ass. G. Budé (Paris, 1975), 195–201, at 201; F.W. Walbank, ‘The idea of decline in Polybius’, in R. Koselleck and P. Widmer (edd.), Niedergang: Studien zu einem geschichtlichen Thema (Stuttgart, 1980), 41–58, at 48–9; Braun (n. 7), 37; Nicolet (n. 7), 26; Walbank (n. 7), 204–5, 212–13; Tuci (n. 7), 59–60; J. Thornton, ‘Leader e masse: aspirazioni e timori nei primi libri delle Storie di Polibio’, in U. Roberto and L. Mecella (edd.), Dalla storiografia ellenistica alla storiografia tardoantica: aspetti, problemi, prospettive (Soveria Mannelli, 2010), 25–58, at 44; Champion (n. 3 [2013]), 125–6.

¹¹ For the biographical context behind Polybius’ insistence on demagogic danger, see C.B. Champion, ‘Polybian demagogues in political context’, HSPh 102 (2004), 199–212; C.B. Champion, ‘Polybius on classical Athenian imperial democracy’, in M. Canevaro and B. Gray (edd.), The Hellenistic Reception of Classical Athenian Democracy and Political Thought (Oxford, 2018), 123–38.

¹² Walbank (n. 7), 203–4; Thornton (n. 10).

¹³ Polyb. 6.56.11; see also 10.25.6.

¹⁴ Polyb. 2.38.6: both values, along with democracy, are both the object of Achaea’s commitment (προαίρϵσις) and the basis of its institutions (σύστημα). On this point, see Tuci (n. 7), 58–60.

¹⁵ Polyb. 4.31.3–4, 27.4.7.

¹⁶ On the vexed question of the nature of Achaean assemblies, see Tuci (n. 7), 68 n. 72; Champion (n. 11 [2004]), 204–5; A. Giovannini, Les relations entre états dans la Grèce antique du temps d’Homère à l’intervention romaine (ca. 700–200 av. J.-C.) (Stuttgart, 2007), 356.

¹⁷ With Walbank (n. 7), 212–13, I take it that they do not (necessarily) exist in aristocracies.

¹⁸ Although this article focusses on interior politics, its scope includes the role of ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in international politics.

¹⁹ Polyb. 3.25.7, 9.36.4, 18.44.2.

²⁰ Polyb. 4.30.5, 4.31.3, 5.76.11, 11.12.3. At 5.106.5, Polybius associates the love of liberty (to be ϕιλϵλϵύθϵρος) with the love of domination (to be ἡγϵμονικός).

²¹ For the traditional opposition of βία and πϵιθώ in Greek thought and its connection with freedom, see R.G.A. Buxton, Persuasion in Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, 1982), 59. Plato links persuasion with freedom at Leg. 720a, 857c (on which, see A. Laks, Plato’s Second Republic [Princeton, 2023], 117–22). For Aristotle, see P. Pellegrin, L’Excellence menacée (Paris, 2017), 197.

²² See e.g. Polyb. 2.42.3.

²³ See respectively Polyb. 32.2.7–8, 36.17.12, 5.11.6.

²⁴ Polyb. 6.4.2: a king rules over willing subjects because they recognize his γνώμη. Imposing one’s will on someone without letting him the time to make up his mind is ‘violent and arrogant’ (29.27.4). As Petzold (n. 8), 70 notes, violence characterizes all corrupt regimes in Polybius. Musti (n. 7), 193 concludes that, for Polybius, democracy is the best simple regime in so far as it gives the greatest recognition to people’s rights.

²⁵ On the Achaean–Spartan relations at that time, see J. Briscoe, ‘Rome and the class struggle in the Greek states 200–146 b.c.’, P&P 36 (1967), 3–20; M.R. Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford, 1969), 132–47, 297–9; J. Deininger, Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland (Berlin, 1971), 119–28.

²⁶ Polyb. 22.12.3. On the contrast between Areus’ criticism and the ideals of the Achaean Confederation, see Petzold (n. 8), 96–7.

²⁷ Polyb. 31.16.2. See also 27.9.6.

²⁸ See e.g. Polyb. 11.10.4: Philopoemen’s ‘main concern, throughout his life, was to say what he thought’. See also 23.12.8.

²⁹ Polyb. 30.32.3.

³⁰ See, for instance, at 29.24 Polybius’ narrative of the debate opposing, on the one hand, his father Lycortas and himself and, on the other hand, Callicrates, on the question whether to send troops to Egypt. See also Polyb. 28.7.1–15.

³¹ Polyb. 4.14.7–8. Polybius himself (2.8.12) and his characters (e.g. 11.4.10, 21.21.5) know that speaking with παρρησία runs the risk of rousing the interlocutor’s anger.

³² See e.g. Polyb. 1.69.4–5 with Thornton (n. 10), 44; 38.12.7–11 with Champion (n. 11 [2004]), 200.

³³ On that opposition in Polybius, see A.M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius (Berkeley, 1995); Champion (n. 3 [2004]), passim.

³⁴ Polyb. 6.47.1–2. See, on this point, J. Ricardo F. Martínez Lacy, “Ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα. Polybius and his concept of culture”, Klio 73 (1991), 83–92; G. Nelsestuen, ‘Custom, fear and self-interest in the political thought of Polybius’, HPTh 38 (2017), 213–38; Champion (n. 3 [2013]). R. Seager, ‘Polybius’ distortions of the Roman “constitution”: a simpl(istic) explanation’, in B. Gibson and T. Harrison, Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank (Oxford, 2013), 246–54, at 254 maintains that the Polybian concept of πολιτϵία only includes ‘written rules’.

³⁵ See Pol. 3.11: the crowd is a better judge of particular political matters than a single individual, but not any crowd will do (1281b15–20). Some resemble beasts (θηρία, 1281b19–20): in Polybius, a crowd filled with passion is ‘made into a beast’ (cf. ἀποθηριοῦσθαι in theoretical—6.9.9—as well as narrative passages—1.67.6, 1.79.8, 1.81.9, 30.11.5).

³⁶ When mentioning demagogic Achaean rulers (e.g. at 10.22.9), Polybius never argues for birth or wealth requirements.

³⁷ Tuci (n. 7), 74.

³⁸ Cf. 6.9.6: those who engage in demagoguery are those who lack ἰδία ἀρϵτή; and at Sparta it is the fact that the γέροντϵς are chosen ἀριστίνδην that explains that they stand on the side of justice (6.10.9; for Rome see 6.24.1). See, on this point (with reference to Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle), Braun (n. 7), 8.

³⁹ States whose rulers are prone to passion, by contrast, do not tolerate free speech: Polyb. 2.8.12, 15.2.2, 16.34.6, 18.52.3. At 36.9.11, Polybius cites the opinion of those who think that ‘a nation of citizens, such as the Roman Republic,’ should deal with others on loyal terms.

⁴⁰ See Polyb. 1.83.3–5. On the destruction of ἰσολογία by the Roman uncontested hegemony, see Ferrary (n. 1 [2014]), 130–1; R. de Nicolay, ‘Théorie et pratique de la πίστις chez Polybe: Rome, l’Achaïe et le monde méditerranéen’, Historia 72 (2023), 386–443, at 431–2. Starting with Quintus Marcus Philippus’ noua sapientia in 184 and Callicrates’ embassy in 180, Rome tolerates less and less παρρησία in the international realm (Polyb. 28.17.2, 31.21.6, 33.11.4–5). For Polybius, however, ἰσολογία is not exclusively based on a balance of forces: the moral standing of the interlocutors is also key (see 24.10.9 with Ferrary [n. 1 (2014)], 122).

⁴¹ Polyb. 24.13.3.

⁴² Polyb. 24.13.5. Ironically, in 183/2 it is the Achaean Confederation that Quintus Marcus Philippus accuses of ‘refusing to submit any question to the Senate, of being more and more presumptuous, to the point of pretending to treat any matter by themselves’ (23.9.8).

⁴³ Polyb. 24.8.2–4.

⁴⁴ Ferrary (n. 1 [2014]), 299: ‘les propos de Philopœmen mettent donc en évidence une loi de la nature, qui définit une évolution inévitable, mais aussi deux grands facteurs qui peuvent en modifier le rythme: il s’agit d’une part des qualités propres du peuple romain, qui doivent lui permettre de résister mieux que d’autres à cette tendance naturelle à toute forme de pouvoir, et d’autre part de l’attitude des peuples sujets, qui peut accélérer ou ralentir cette évolution.’

⁴⁵ Polyb. 1.69.10, 15.19.2–3, 28.4.12, 30.11.6.

⁴⁶ Polyb. 38.13.1–2. To be sure, the Elders who undertook to ‘prevent [Critolaus] from uttering such words’ did not show an example of commitment to παρρησία. Cf. also 30.29.6, where Polybius tells how ‘when anyone tried, in Panhellenic festivals, to praise [Callicrates and his friends], he was booed and mocked’. Polybius is not saying, however, that he approves of either attitude. But one man’s παρρησία may be another man’s δημαγωγία: Polybius could be read as saying that an orator who is entirely prey to passion (Critolaus, in his view) or calls his country to servitude (Callicrates) has given up on political rationality and does not deserve to be heard. Aristainos, by contrast, did not belong to that category (Ferrary [n. 1 (2014)], 294–9): debate with him had to respect the norms of ἰσηγορία and παρρησία. It is likely, however, that this problem—of having to distinguish ‘deliberation-helping’ from ‘deliberation-thwarting’ παρρησία—would have less importance in the balanced regime, at least between the three constituent parts: fear limits the rhetorical means which speakers from one constituent part decide to use against orators belonging to another.

⁴⁷ Straumann (n. 5), 26–7.

⁴⁸ Polyb. 6.9.1–9.

⁴⁹ That does not mean that ἰσηγορία and παρρησία were limited to the judicial realm: non-oligarchs could also have suffered from decrees voted without anyone being able to speak against them.

⁵⁰ This account builds on, but differs from, Cole’s (n. 10), 461–2; he sees the use of money in politics as the solvent of παρρησία. I rather see the loss of commitment to παρρησία (and ἰσηγορία) as the cause of the politicians’ use of money in campaigning and of the people’s acceptance of it. Cf. Pédech (n. 10 [1975]), 201: ‘la richesse est le levier politique de ceux qui n’ont plus le goût de l’égalité et de la liberté.’ Nelsestuen (n. 34) mentions that habituation to stability causes younger generations not to fear for their regime, but he does not go into details.

⁵¹ As noted by Cole (n. 10), 461; Welwei (n. 7), 290; Musti (n. 7), 194. But democratic παρρησία, for Polybius, remains bound by ethical constraints: Critolaus made excessive use of it, because he was—Polybius thinks—a raving demagogue.

⁵² P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), 58.

⁵³ D.E. Hahm, ‘Polybius’ applied political theory’, in A. Laks and M. Schofield (edd.), Justice and Generosity (Cambridge, 1995), 7–47, at 21. See also Cole (n. 10), 470 n. 83.

⁵⁴ Polyb. 6.6.5. Examples abound throughout the Histories: Antiochus III weeps before Achaius’ torture because he thinks that something similar could happen to him (8.19.9–10); Scipio Aemilianus sheds tears before Carthage, because Rome might suffer the same fate (38.21.1–3).

⁵⁵ Hahm (n. 53), 21.

⁵⁶ Next to justice as reciprocal benefaction, Polybius recognizes a second moral notion, τὸ καλόν, which is supererogatory (but needs to be responded to with reciprocal benefaction, 6.8.9).

⁵⁷ Hahm (n. 53), 24–5.

⁵⁸ Hahm (n. 53), 25: ‘Anyone who has had no experience of personal suffering or has never developed a sense of vulnerability is, on Polybius’ theory, precluded from developing moral conceptions or any appreciation of the value of co-operative behavior. Such a person is consequently dominated by an innate tendency toward self-aggrandizement, which results in oppressive, self-centred rule, i.e., tyranny, oligarchy, or mob-rule.’

⁵⁹ Cole (n. 10), 479; Musti (n. 7), 194; Champion (n. 3 [2004]), 89–95; D. Baronowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism (Bristol, 2011), 156; G. Longley, ‘Thucydides, Polybius, and human nature’, in C. Smith and L.M. Yarrow (edd.), Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius (Oxford, 2012), 68–84, at 75–8. Contra, see J.M. Alonso-Núñez, ‘The anacyclosis in Polybius’, Eranos 84 (1986), 17–22, at 17; Walbank (n. 7), 219–20.

⁶⁰ Cf. also Polyb. 6.18.5–8, where Polybius mentions the multitude’s temptation to claim supremacy in the balanced regime, once the state has reached imperial domination; and 6.48.8, where ϕιλαρχία and πλϵονϵξία are the two agents of corruption that lead Sparta to its fall, once it has become hegemonic. On the historical underpinnings of Polybius’ notion of political corruption, see Pédech (n. 10 [1975]); G. Zecchini, Polibio. La solitudine dello storico (Rome, 2015), 123–34.

⁶¹ Cole (n. 10), 481.

⁶² Polyb. 2.21.8. On the similarities between Polybius’ theoretical (Book 6) and narrative passages, see Tuci (n. 7), 84: we should beware of taxing Polybius with ‘strabismus’.

⁶³ A similar portrait is given of other Roman demagogues, such as Marcus Minucius Rufus (3.90.6). Cf. also 20.6.1–3 (Thebes).

⁶⁴ Polyb. 6.10.11 and 4.31.4. See, on this point, Straumann (n. 5), 32.

⁶⁵ Nicolet (n. 7), 29.

⁶⁶ Livy 3.37.5, 3.41.6.

⁶⁷ Livy 3.54.5–12, 3.55.6–7.

⁶⁸ F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius. Volume 1 (Oxford, 1957), 674; W. Blösel, ‘Die anakyklosis -Theorie und die Verfassung Roms im Spiegel des sechsten Buches des Polybios und Ciceros De re publica, Buch II’, Hermes 126 (1998), 31–57, at 34; D.W. Moore, Polybius: Experience and the Lessons of History (Leiden and Boston, 2020), 99.

⁶⁹ If this is right, we should distinguish two things in the Roman balanced regime: on the one hand, popular attachment to an equal right to speak for plebeians (citizens at contiones; tribunes among themselves and vis-à-vis other Roman office-holders) or at least to a right to have their interests taken into account and voiced in public fora, based on feelings of vulnerability, memories of subjection, and the perception that limiting the right of the plebs to contribute to political decisions is unjust; on the other hand, the constitutional underpinnings (mutual dependence and δέος) that convince other parts of the regime to let the tribunes use ἰσηγορία and παρρησία. The people’s attachment to equal consideration, in public fora, of the interests of all its members would also object to corruption by office-holders other than tribunes (candidates to the consulship, for instance).

⁷⁰ I focus here on ϕιλαρχία because it is, at 6.9.5–6, directly opposed by the ‘republican’ ethos of democracy. But it is only one of the two possible causes of decline for the balanced regime (6.57.5–7): the other goes through material and financial πλϵονϵξία.

⁷¹ It may be that ἰσηγορία and παρρησία form a part of the aristocratic ethos too in Polybius’ eyes. Members of the senatorial class, feeling vulnerable as any part of the balanced regime, would stick together and value the equal right to speak freely for their members. Historians have shown that certamen gloriae among young nobiles was indeed curbed by attachment to certain rules (cf. K.-J. Hölkeskamp, Die Entstehung der Nobilität [Stuttgart, 1987], 227). If, for Polybius, Rome’s aristocrats value ἰσηγορία and παρρησία for each other, then such commitment would also weaken once the city has achieved hegemony.

⁷² I thank the anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify this point.

⁷³ In other words, Polybius does not think that the balanced regime should be strengthened by reinforcing its democratic element; rather, his view is that the balanced regime will gain from a strengthened commitment to ἰσηγορία and παρρησία within the democratic element (and, possibly, in the ruling class at large: see n. 71 above).

⁷⁴ That effort is helped and fuelled by the commitment of the ally—for instance Achaea—to ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in its inner politics. Cf. Polyb. 4.31.3–4, where it is quite clear that Polybius the Achaean defends ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in both the interior and the international realms. See also Polyb. 2.42.3. However, Polybius knows that some states have an internal ethos that does not translate in its international attitudes: Sparta, for instance, is interiorly deprived of ϕιλοτιμία and πλϵονϵξία, which however show in its attitude towards other Greek states (6.48.8). Rhodes is well known for its commitment to ἰσηγορία and παρρησία in the international realm (Polyb. 27.4.7), and does not seem to have been a democracy in Polybius’ times: see Musti (n. 7), 200 n. 149; V. Gabrielsen, The Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes (Aarhus, 1997); H.-U. Wiemer, Krieg, Handel und Piraterie: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des hellenistischen Rhodos (Berlin, 2002), 31–2.

⁷⁵ But, one might ask, why not just change democracy into a balanced regime? Is it not the greatest service one can render to it? As Musti (n. 7) noted after Aristotle, not all reforms are adapted to all countries at all times. ‘Democratic’ Achaia, probably, was not ready for the balanced regime: the best it could do was to remain a democracy.

⁷⁶ In the same logic, Philopoemen did not hope that Rome could forever resist acting unjustly, but strove to postpone the event (Polyb. 24.13.6). We should beware, however, of taking Polybius’ pronouncements on the naturalness of anacyclosis (Polyb. 6.9.10) as proof of its ineluctability: the narrative of the Histories is sufficient proof that there is leeway (see, for instance, Polyb. 2.44.10, Achaia’s passage from tyranny to democracy). There are foreign interventions, and τύχη is always on the look-out to thwart ϕύσις.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 11.2.5–6, 16.10.2.

⁷⁸ See e.g. Polyb. 1.61.5, 1.64.1–2, 5.34.10, 5.107.3, 6.44.3–6, 8.24.1, 9.10.6, 9.11.2, 10.36.3, 31.25.6, 39.7.7.

⁷⁹ Polyb. 6.11a.10. For an illustration, see Polyb. 16.23.5.

⁸⁰ Polyb. 7.4.6–8, 16.22.4. For the depiction of youth as inexperienced in Polybius, see B. McGing, ‘Youthfulness in Polybius: the case of Philip V of Macedon’, in B. Gibson and T. Harrison, Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank (Oxford, 2013), 189–99.

⁸¹ Polyb. 6.18.8 (δϵδιότα).

⁸² Polyb. 6.34.12, 6.37.6.

⁸³ See D. Mendels’s influential statement in ‘Polybius and the socio-economic revolution in Greece (227–146 b.c.)’, AC 51 (1982), 86–110, at 109: ‘Polybius was hostile to every attempt to change the socio-economic and political status quo in favour of the populace.’ See also Braun (n. 7), 7. W. Nippel, Mischverfassungstheorie und Verfasssungsrealität in Antike und früher Neuzeit (Stuttgart, 1980), 145 charges Polybius with blindness to socio-economic causes of political events: ‘die Verfassungstheorie hat bei Polybios ihre soziologische Dimension verloren.’

⁸⁴ R. Balot, ‘Polybius’ advice to the imperial republic’, Political Theory 38 (2010), 483–509, at 488.

⁸⁵ Balot (n. 84), 501.

⁸⁶ Polyb. 29.20.1–3.

⁸⁷ Polyb. 15.21.3–8. Cf. Polyb. 5.75.5 and 38.11.11.

⁸⁸ E.g. Alexander the Aetolian at Polyb. 13.1a.1. See on this point Moore (n. 68), 73–4.

⁸⁹ Polyb. 8.21.10–11. See also Polyb. 10.32.12. On the importance of the unexpected in Polybius, see F. Maier, ‘Überall mit dem Unerwarteten rechnen’. Die Kontingenz historischer Prozesse bei Polybios (Munich, 2012).

⁹⁰ Polyb. 12.25e.6; cf. 6.3.2, 15.36.7. On this point, see D.W. Moore, ‘Learning from experience: Polybius and the progress of Rome’, CQ 67 (2017), 132–48, at 146 n. 60.

⁹¹ On this point, see, in general, Moore (n. 68).

⁹² Polyb. 1.35.7. See also 1.1.1.

⁹³ Cf. Moore (n. 68), 95: ‘While the ability to learn and adapt based on their experiences is what will distinguish the more advanced societies in the anakyklosis from the initial primitive society, the inability to transmit this knowledge through history renders each stage in the cycle ultimately unstable.’

⁹⁴ Polyb. 38.21–2 (Scipio Aemilianus at Carthage).

⁹⁵ Polyb. 6.53.3 with Moore (n. 68), 103–4.

⁹⁶ Moore (n. 68), 105: ‘This analysis of the beneficial aspects of the aristocratic funeral at Rome clearly reflects Polybius’ notion of the value of history.’