Hostname: page-component-68c7f8b79f-m4fzj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-12-18T22:44:36.116Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

HERODOTUS ON THE EXPEDITION OF DATIS AND ARTAPHRENES: ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM MIRRORED IN THE FIRST PERSIAN WAR

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2025

Julian Degen
Julian Degen*
Affiliation:
University of Innsbruck
*
julian.degen@uibk.ac.at
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

By accepting a later dating for the composition of the Histories, this article argues that Herodotus mirrors Athenian imperialism in his account of the First Persian War to convey a political message to contemporary recipients. In doing so, he departs from the prevailing tradition of the expedition of Datis and Artaphrenes by creating a narrative that manipulates Persian methods of conquest, presenting them in a manner that appears emblematic of Athenian imperialism. In this way, the Herodotean Persians do not adhere to their expected cultural script, but act out the Athenian script. This reading offers a new understanding of Herodotus’ account of the Persian campaign as conveying a message to the Athenians who began to recognize that their former policies toward their allies were transgressive imperialism. As a result, his account of the First Persian War is a sophisticated meditation on the effects of imperialism rather than a straightforward depiction of historical events.

Keywords

AthensPersian WarsImperialismAchaemenid EmpireEretriaAncient Near East

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , First View , pp. 1 - 14
Check for updates
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

It is widely held in Herodotean studies that both the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War resonate throughout the Histories, despite the fact that the work is focused on a much earlier series of events known as the Persian Wars.Footnote 1 Given the complexity of Herodotus’ account, which prevents it from being reduced to a single function or message, the question arises as to how the convergence of past and present results in a salient political message from the author to contemporary recipients.Footnote 2 Comprehending this message provoked an intense and still vibrant scholarly debate on Herodotus as a historian of the Persian Wars.Footnote 3 Our understanding of the events surrounding this conflict is significantly influenced by our evaluation of the reliability of the Histories. Given the dearth of alternatives to Herodotus, modern historians are obliged to follow his account faithfully or to rationalize passages that are perceived as ostentatious in their depiction of the Greeks’ conflict with the empire.Footnote 4 A new interpretation of the political message inherent in Histories could, therefore, yield a nuanced understanding of Herodotus as a historian, his narrative and, consequently, the Persian Wars as a historical event.

This article examines the political message embedded in Herodotus’ account of the expedition of Datis and Artaphrenes (Hdt. 6.96–118), namely the First Persian War. By manipulating existing narratives and adjusting their contexts regarding Persian methods of conquest and the motivations underlying their implementation, Herodotus crafts a narrative that mirrors Athenian imperialism as being Persian. As a result, his Persians behave like the Athenians did when expanding their power. This mirroring carries narrative weight, as it responds to the prevailing sentiment among Athenians who, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, began to recognise their previous policies towards the Greeks as a manifestation of transgressive imperialism. I begin with an outline of the challenges that complicate the interpretation of the political message within the Histories.

I. HERODOTUS’ POLITICAL MESSAGE

The debate surrounding Herodotus’ message to his recipients is defined by two critical, albeit contentious, parameters that, when redefined, can alter the prevailing understanding of the Histories. The first parameter is the date of its composition and its possible recipients. Scholarship went a long way from viewing Herodotus as a pro-Athenian writer, even belonging to Pericles’ entourage, to emphasizing his critical stance towards Athenian politics, whether tacitly or more explicitly conceivable in his work.Footnote 5 Modern historians commonly approach Herodotus’ view on Athens through Thucydides’ account in order to contextualize the Histories within their time of composition. Luraghi has questioned this approach by proposing a historicized reading of Herodotus that goes beyond the limited focus of Thucydides on his time. He adopted a perspective on the political message as it might have been plausibly interpreted by a reader at the end of the Archidamian War. As the Achaemenid Empire still cast a long shadow over the Greek world in the 420s, he argued that Herodotus’ message to his audience constituted a call for a united front against the Persians, rather than a critique of Athens.Footnote 6 Luraghi’s interpretation is tempting and persuasive, but it posits an early date for the composition of the Histories around 424. Recently, Irwin has made a provocative yet thoroughly convincing argument for dating its publication to the late phase or even after the end of the Peloponnesian War.Footnote 7 If we accept a late date for when Herodotus gave the final touches to his work, the interpretation of its underlying political message changes significantly. He might have written an account of the Persian Wars for an audience that had witnessed the fatal outcome of Athenian imperialism.

The second parameter pertains to the intentional narrative choices of Herodotus as a narrator of the Persian Wars, particularly regarding whether his account can be faithfully followed. In addressing this question, scholars continue to explore the narrative matrix of space and time within the Histories.Footnote 8 Consequently, imperialism, as the overarching theme of his narrative, recedes into the background and has not attracted the scholarly attention it deserves thus far. Still, specialists on ancient empires have highlighted that these empires intentionally deployed methods of imperialism, whether in the context of conquest or punishment, intentionally rather than unsystematically.Footnote 9 An examination of Herodotus’ presentation of imperial methods provides a compelling means to re-evaluate his narrative, particularly as it permits the application of an analytical lens to scrutinize its narrative structure within the context of accounts situated in diverse cultural frameworks.Footnote 10 Such an examination enables us to ask whether the agents in Herodotus’ narrative adhere to the expectations of their original cultural context or whether we can detect a degree of intentional narrative choice.

A revaluation of methods of imperialism, in light of their cultural and narrative contexts and a late dating as parameters, thus has the potential to yield a novel interpretation of the Histories as source on the Persian Wars. It is now the Persian methods of conquest that merit critical examination.

II. METHODS OF CONQUEST IN HERODOTUS 6.96–118

Herodotus leaves no room for doubt that Darius I’s primary goal was to punish Athens and Eretria when giving orders to Datis and Artaphrenes to campaign towards Greece.Footnote 11 The two city-states’ roles in the Histories differ significantly. While Athens is one of the main protagonists, the role of Eretria deserves some clarification.

The dispersed history of Eretria in Herodotus’ work begins with the pretext of the war of the Ionians with the empire and a preceding diplomatic encounter between Athens and the satraps. Whether this encounter led to the initiation of diplomatic relations that resulted in an alliance or a form of dependency must, however, remain unclear due to the absence of reliable information.Footnote 12 Whatever the case, the empire perceived Athens’ support of the Ionian Revolt as a violation of a previously concluded treaty.Footnote 13 Although the Eretrians also supported the Ionians, their motivations diverged markedly from those of the Athenians. Herodotus remarks that the Athenians asserted their intention to defend themselves against potential future aggression from the empire, whereas the Eretrians supported the Ionian Revolt due to Miletus’ prior assistance in their conflicts with Chalcis.Footnote 14 In the course of events, the Ionians and their allies destroyed the satrapal city of Sardis, along with her sanctuaries.Footnote 15 Faced with the imperatives of Achaemenid royal ideology, which posited that the destruction of sanctuaries would disrupt the cosmic order, Darius was compelled to take action.Footnote 16 Herodotus notes that a court servant persistently urged Darius to punish the Athenians. As a consequence, the Great King resolved to go to war. He gave orders to Datis and Artaphrenes to enslave the Athenians and Eretrians, bringing them to him as slaves, while also subduing all Greek states that had previously denied subjugation in the form of providing ‘earth and water’.Footnote 17 This was followed by the expedition known as the First Persian War.

Herodotus’ account of the expedition led by Datis and Artaphrenes begins with their attack on Naxos and Delos, before proceeding to besiege the Euboean cities of Carystos and Eretria.Footnote 18 He states that the fierce resistance of Eretria was broken through treachery, leading to the following punishment of the city and its inhabitants:

οἳ δὲ ἐσελθόντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν τοῦτο μὲν τὰ ἱρὰ συλήσαντες ἐνέπρησαν, ἀποτινύμενοι τῶν ἐν Σάρδισι κατακαυθέντων ἱρῶν, τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠνδραποδίσαντο κατὰ τὰς Δαρείου ἐντολάς.

They (sc. the Persians) entered the city and plundered and burnt the temples, in revenge for the temples that were burnt at Sardis; moreover, they enslaved the townspeople, according to Darius’ command.Footnote 19

After punishing the Eretrians for burning the sanctuaries of Sardis, the imperial army proceeded to move to Attica. There, at Marathon, Datis and Artaphrenes were defeated, prompting their decision to withdraw from Greece to Asia.Footnote 20 Surprisingly, when Datis sailed back to Asia, he had a vision in his sleep that compelled him to return a statue of Apollo, taken as plunder, to the Delians.Footnote 21 When the imperial army returned to Asia, it had failed to achieve its strategic objectives. Although the generals did not succeed in punishing Athens, they still had the Eretrians with them, whom they brought to Darius. Once the Eretrians were taken to court, the Great King astonishingly showed compassion and permitted them to dwell on his estates in Cissia.Footnote 22 By mentioning the place where the deportees were settled, Herodotus concludes his account of the expedition of Datis and Artaphrenes.

Even when Herodotus’ account of the events surrounding this expedition appears to the modern reader as a listing of historical events without any recognisable intentions, his choice of words to describe imperial methods still has a deeper meaning. During this expedition, the Persians used two methods of conquest: enslavement and deportation. Their contexts merit investigation.

Herodotus specifically employs the term ἀνδραποδίζω to describe the Persians’ treatment of the islanders, a term he uses rather infrequently. His choice of words holds particular significance in the Histories. That this was deliberate is evident, as Thucydides, in referring to the subjugation of the islands under Darius, uses the term δουλεύω.Footnote 23 While δουλεύω expresses the state of being or becoming a slave, the term ἀνδραποδίζω indicates a method of empire. This latter term denotes that after the defeat of a city’s forces, women and adolescent boys within the civilian population were randomly killed and enslaved, with the intention of instilling terror to compel obedience.Footnote 24 ἀνδραποδίζω dominates Herodotus’ account of the expedition, as can be seen by the fact that Datis and Artaphrenes closely followed Darius’ order by enslaving the Eretrians and bringing them as slaves.Footnote 25 Herodotus consistently uses the verb ἀνδραποδίζω to describe the methods of conquest deployed in the First Persian War, indicating that he did not consider it interchangeable.Footnote 26 Its exclusive use suggests that Herodotus closely associates this method with the Persians, imbuing it with a unique and special meaning in the Histories. Since Thucydides, with one exception, exclusively aligns ἀνδραποδίζω with Athenian imperialism,Footnote 27 it becomes evident that Herodotus employed this term because his audience was well acquainted with its semantics, thereby facilitating an understanding that he was alluding to contemporary Athens. Given this allusion, the question arises as to whether Herodotus accurately described a Persian method of conquest or subtly hinted at Athens.

III. THE CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF PERSIAN IMPERIAL METHODS

Herodotus’ account of the deportation of the Eretrians is peculiar and markedly different when compared with those of other authors describing the same expedition. Besides Herodotus, Plato, Strabo and Philostratus also mention the deportation. Even though these authors do not present historical facts that contradict Herodotus, they employ different terminology to describe how the Persians subdued and captured the Eretrians. They uniformly assert that the Persians captured the Eretrians like fish in a net (σαγηνεύω), interpreting this as Persian soldiers forming a cordon as they advanced from the coast to the heart of the island, so that no one could escape.Footnote 28 Herodotus portrays the Persians utilizing a method of netting islanders when subjugating the Aegean islands and Ionian cities, albeit with a notable exception in the case of Eretria.Footnote 29 Thus, it is evident that, in this instance, Herodotus employs a narrative that diverges from the methods typically attributed to the Persians during other occasions of the expedition. As described in the Histories, netting islanders is a method reserved for occasions where populations have previously defied imperial authority.Footnote 30 To be sure, the context in which the Persians normally employ this method also applies to the Eretrians, who defied imperial authority by supporting the Ionians.Footnote 31 By comparing Herodotus’ account with the extant tradition, a disparity emerges that suggests two interpretations. On the one hand, one could suggest that two distinct traditions regarding the fall of Eretria were prevalent in Herodotus’ time.Footnote 32 On the other hand, it is plausible to infer that Herodotus consciously departed from the prevailing tradition, thereby indicating a degree of intentional narrative choice.

Locating the method of netting within its original cultural context, the ancient Near East, further substantiates the assumption that, in this case, Herodotus has his Persians diverging from their typical imperial script. Scholars have observed that the method described by Greek authors corresponds to the trope of the king netting his enemies, a motif commonly found in the language of power employed by ancient Near Eastern empires.Footnote 33 Classicists have tended to rationalize or attempt to explain the method mentioned in the Histories through comparison with ethnographic literature. However, in doing so, they neglect the significance of the sea and its islanders within the worldview of ancient Near Eastern empires.Footnote 34 A critical examination of this significance is essential for a deeper understanding of the methods deployed by the Herodotean Persians.

In the history of the ancient Near Eastern empires, the Neo-Assyrian period represents a turning point in the evolution of the Mediterranean as a reference point for asserting universal rulership. While the coast of the sea was previously utilized as a literary device to claim world domination, the sustained success of the Assyrian rulers necessitated an expansion of this claim to include islands situated in the unknown midst of the sea.Footnote 35 The inhabitants of these islands, referred to as Yamnāya/Yamanāya in Akkadian, likely correspond to any Aegean peoples whom the Assyrians associated with the western extreme of the world.Footnote 36 Capturing these islanders served as proof of their control over the entire world. The agonistic behaviour of the Assyrian kings further expanded the prevailing mental map, relocating the contexts in which the king captures enemies with a net.Footnote 37 Furthermore, the trope of netting enemies suggests that they were considered rebels.Footnote 38 The message conveyed by these tropes was one of overarching power: the king can capture even those rebels hiding at the farthest reaches of the world. With the Assyrians serving as a role model for the Achaemenids in many respects, the trope of capturing islanders with nets was likely crucial to their concept of empire.Footnote 39

The Histories present a plethora of examples illustrating the adherence of the Great Kings to the Assyrian narrative of imperial expansion. Herodotus inextricably associates the conquest of islands with the imperial ambitions of Asian rulers. Nearly all Asian rulers in Herodotus’ account aspire to capture the islands of the Mediterranean within a competitive context. Croesus stands as the first king to express a desire to subdue the Aegean islands. Despite his awareness of the impracticality of his ambitions, he none the less proceeded to negotiate a treaty with the local inhabitants.Footnote 40 In contrast to Lydian history, ancient Near Eastern concepts of empire resonate more profoundly within Herodotus’ accounts of the conquests of the Teispids and Achaemenids. A notable parallel emerges between the imperial rhetoric of the ancient Near East and the fate of the rebel Pactyes, who sought refuge from Cyrus on the islands. Owing to the far reach of the Great King, the inhabitants apprehend the rebel and return him to the empire.Footnote 41 While Cyrus exerted considerable political influence over the Ionians living on the islands, he still resorted to threats, which ultimately compelled them to submit.Footnote 42 The islands and the sea continued to serve as significant markers for asserting imperial success following Cambyses’ succession to the Persian throne. The Persians extolled his achievements in adding Cyprus, Egypt and the surrounding seas to the empire.Footnote 43 Under the reign of Darius, the empire expanded to encompass the entirety of Western Asia, parts of Libya and territories across the sea, including various European peoples and islands extending to Thessaly.Footnote 44 According to Herodotus, Darius’ imperial ambitions encompassed the entire Mediterranean Sea, as he invited competitive satraps to propose the incorporation of Samos and even Sardinia into the empire.Footnote 45 Even when the aspirations of the Great Kings and their satraps were not fully realized, they none the less provide compelling evidence that Asian rulers were guided by the principles of ancient Near Eastern royal ideology within Herodotus’ narrative.

A careful consideration of the original context of the Persian methods as described by Herodotus reveals that, in the case of Eretria, the Persians notably deviate from their established cultural script in a most remarkable and uncharacteristic fashion. The Eretrians, it would appear, were to be netted, as if the Persians were enacting an ancient Near Eastern trope.Footnote 46 Likewise, Darius’ behaviour towards the Eretrians, in presenting them before him, suggests that Herodotus is not closely following a specific source. Rather he created a narrative in character with his typical portrayal of the Great Kings. By arbitrarily reversing his decision, Darius conforms to the model of a Herodotean Great King, exemplifying ambiguity in his interactions with both subjects and enemies.Footnote 47 Having examined the Persian methods of imperialism against the backdrop of their cultural context, it is now time to explore the motivations underlying the Persians’ behaviour towards the islanders, as described by Herodotus.

IV. RESONANCES OF ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM IN HERODOTUS 6.96–118

Herodotus’ account of the military campaign of Datis and Artaphrenes against Euboea and Athens constitutes a complex narrative that encompasses a series of events, including the sack of Naxos, an earthquake at Delos, the Persians’ sacrifices at Delos, the siege of Carystos, the sack of Eretria, the army’s landing at Marathon and their withdrawal to Asia. Instead of following the chronological order, I shall begin with the earthquake at Delos.

The most notable episode of the entire military campaign is Herodotus’ distinctive interpretation of the earthquake that occurred on Delos in the immediate aftermath of the Persians’ departure from Euboea. By portraying the earthquake as a divine portent, he suggests to his recipients that he is, in fact, alluding to the turbulent events that befell the Greeks during his own lifetime. A comparative analysis of Herodotus’ explanation and Thucydides’ mention of a comparable occurrence highlights the intentionality inherent in Herodotus’ narrative. While both authors allude to the earthquake as an exceptional event, their dating of this occurrence diverges, giving rise to an intense scholarly debate.Footnote 48 Herodotus dates the earthquake to 490 and remarks that between the reigns of Darius, Xerxes and Artaxerxes, the Persians brought misfortune to the Greeks and precipitated a struggle for hegemony more than had occurred in the preceding twenty generations.Footnote 49 In contrast, Thucydides mentions an earthquake at Delos, which took place prior to the summer of 431. He links this occurrence to the impending outbreak of the greatest war among the Greeks, which was anticipated by prophecies and oracles.Footnote 50 Given that the earthquake was a well-known occurrence in the ancient Greek world, as Thucydides suggests, it is possible that Herodotus aimed to allude to events known to his recipients, with a view to rendering his intentions intelligible to them.Footnote 51 Three aspects of Herodotus’ account lend further credence to this interpretation.

The first aspect of the Persians’ expedition deserving of consideration is the route taken from Asia Minor to Euboea and Attica, culminating in their eventual withdrawal to Asia. The fleet’s navigation began in Cilicia, proceeding to Samos, thereafter crossing the Icarian Sea, and navigating from island to island over Naxos, Delos and Euboea.Footnote 52 Herodotus affords particular significance to three key stations during the fleet’s navigation. The emphasis suggests that these stations were of paramount importance to his narrative, as evidenced by his omission of stations referenced in other sources.Footnote 53 Herodotus explicitly states that Naxos was the primary target of the Persians (πρώτην ἐπεῖχον στρατεύεσθαι), and that the Naxians were subsequently enslaved (οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι ἀνδραποδισάμενοι), and their city and sanctuaries reduced to ashes, before the Persians moved to other islands.Footnote 54 The Naxian annals—that is, a fragment aligned with a now lost anonymous account (FGrHist 105 F 3)—cast doubt upon Herodotus’ assertion. According to these annals, the Naxians successfully repulsed Datis after he set their city on fire, despite having become subjects of the Persians shortly thereafter.Footnote 55 Moreover, a close reading of Herodotus’ narrative alongside Thucydides’ account of the ascendancy of Athens as the prime maritime power in the Aegean suggests a rationale for Herodotus’ divergence from prevailing narratives. Thucydides explicitly states that Naxos marked the first instance of an ally severing ties with Athens and thus becoming subjugated (πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχὶς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη), paralleling Herodotus’ assertion that the island was the first target of the Persians.Footnote 56 Additionally, Thucydides says that before the subjugation of Naxos, the Athenian fleet engaged in hostilities against the Carystians, a campaign that likely took place around 469. The Carystians held considerable significance for the Delian League, as they were the first city-state compelled to join following an attack and subsequent surrender under specific conditions.Footnote 57 Given Athens’ ruthless imperialistic policy, a compelling parallel may be drawn between the Herodotean Persians and the Thucydidean Athenians regarding their respective approaches to the Carystians. Herodotus indicates that the Carystians initially resisted Persian overtures but ultimately capitulated while under siege.Footnote 58 It thus becomes evident that his account of the Persian expedition resonates with Thucydides’ account of the expansion of Athenian power.

The second aspect pertains to Datis’ visit to Delos. Upon reaching the island, he dispatched heralds to the Delians, who had previously sought refuge in Tenos. What comes as a surprise is that unlike their treatment of other islands, the Persians did not enslave the inhabitants of Delos but rather demonstrated respect for the sacredness of the site. They addressed the Delians as ‘holy men’ (ἄνδρες ἱροί), performed sacrifices at their sanctuaries, and encouraged them to return to their homeland.Footnote 59 In addition, during the Persians’ subsequent withdrawal to Asia, Datis revisited Delos, where he returned a statue of Apollo, which he intended to be transported to Theban Delium.Footnote 60 This episode may be subject to multiple interpretations. One interpretation posits that the Persians sought to legitimize their expansion in the eyes of the Greeks by venerating local customs and conducting sacrifices at sanctuaries. This interpretation aligns with the tendency of empires to preserve local traditions as a means of accommodating their new subjects.Footnote 61 It is also plausible that Herodotus is alluding to contemporary Athenian policies. Several parallels can be drawn between his account of the Persians at Delos and Athens’ behaviour toward the Delians and sanctuaries dedicated to Apollo.

Thucydides records that the Athenians called the Delians back to their homes in 421, following their earlier expulsion due to the calamities of war and Apollo’s directive.Footnote 62 This event is said to have occurred shortly after the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias. Herodotus subtly underscores Datis’ connection with Apollo, suggesting that the divine will influenced his actions. He highlights the striking detail that when Datis approached Delos, he anchored at Rheana, a site known to have been dedicated to Delian Apollo since the era of Polycrates.Footnote 63 Another noteworthy aspect of Datis’ unique relationship with Apollo is manifest in the substantial offering of three hundred talents of frankincense, which has elicited scepticism among modern commentators.Footnote 64 Although Herodotus acknowledges the extraordinary offering, he provides no contextual explanation for it. His recipients might have linked Datis’ offerings to Athens’ revival of the so-called ‘Delian Games’ in 426, an event to which the city contributed generously.Footnote 65 Even later authors continued to perceive Athens’ extensive contributions to the festivities as exemplary, possibly elucidating Datis’ distinctive sacrifices as a subtle reference to Athenian accomplishments emblematic of their display of power.Footnote 66

There are two reasons to regard Datis’ offerings, as described by Herodotus, as allusions to Athens rather than as historical facts. First, in the Histories, where νόμος dictates cultural behaviour, the Persians do not adhere to the practice of sacrificing at altars or burning offerings.Footnote 67 Secondly, Herodotus notes that the Persians treated the sanctuary of Apollo with reverence and even sought to recover a plundered statue from the Theban sanctuary of Delium. This juxtaposition may serve as a counterexample that mirrors Athenian actions during the Archidamian War. In 424, the Athenians fortified Delium while fighting the Boeotians, an action that Thucydides regarded as a grave transgression against Hellenic laws.Footnote 68 By accentuating the Persians’ benevolent treatment of the sanctuaries, Herodotus may have created a deliberate contrast between attitudes of the Persians and Athenians towards sanctuaries dedicated to Apollo, thereby alluding to the latter’s imperialistic actions.Footnote 69 Once more, the convergence of their motivations in the Histories suggests that Herodotus mirrored Athenian actions in his account of the First Persian War. The context of the third aspect further strengthens this impression.

Herodotus states that the Eretrians were deported to Cissia. As previously outlined, the context of the Persians’ punishment of Eretria through deportation does not align with ancient Near Eastern methods of empire. This episode may suggest that Herodotus was hinting at a similar occurrence with which his audience would likely have been familiar. In 446, Athens deported the elites of Hestiaea when they, along with other city-states, rebelled against Athenian authority during the so-called ‘Euboean Revolt’.Footnote 70 Plutarch notes that when the Euboean cities revolted against Athens, Pericles subdued them and inexorably (ἀπαραιτήτως) expelled the Hestiaeans, whom he refers to as ἱπποβόται.Footnote 71 Whereas Plutarch discusses events of 446, Herodotus describes an almost identical scenario in an account concerning the Chalcidean ἱπποβόται, which dates back to 506.Footnote 72 In Herodotus’ account, the Athenians achieved victory in a battle in Boeotia before campaigning against Euboea, a narrative that mirrors the circumstances surrounding the Euboean Revolt.Footnote 73 Aside from that, he refers to the Athenian settlers on the land formerly occupied by the ἱπποβόται using the term κληροῦχος. This term carries significant connotations given its association with deportation, a practice which Athens frequently employed as a tool of imperialism.Footnote 74 The fact that Herodotus mentions the Chalcidean ἱπποβόται being fettered, with their chains displayed at the acropolis of Athens until his time, enhances the impression that he regarded them as having been forcibly deported and enslaved.Footnote 75 Thus it is unsurprising that Athens’ suppression of the revolt provided the pretext for yet another uprising of the Euboeans against Athenian domination in 411.Footnote 76 In light of this context, some commentators have interpreted Herodotus’ account as a veiled allusion to the Euboean Revolt, often dated to 446. Their conjecture is further supported by inscriptions.Footnote 77 Consequently, it can be inferred that Herodotus alludes to the Histiaeans in his depiction of the Eretrians’ fate, particularly given their absence from the events of the First Persian War.

Modern readers may find the allusion of the Eretrians to the Histiaeans unconvincing, as the Euboean Revolt is often portrayed as a minor event in handbooks and monographs dedicated to the Classical period. However, contemporaries perceived it as a significant punishment imposed by Athens. While Thucydides briefly mentions Pericles’ suppression of the revolt and the subsequent resettlement of Athenians, other authors have highlighted the severity of Athens’ imperialistic methods employed to quash the revolt.Footnote 78 More explicitly, Aristophanes in Clouds (423) remarks that Euboea was ‘stretched’ by the Athenians, under the leadership of Pericles (ὑπὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους).Footnote 79 As Sommerstein notes, the verb παρετάθη has two meanings: one conveys the shape and position of the island, while the other suggests the sense of ‘render helpless’ or ‘knock out’.Footnote 80 This clearly alludes to the brutal suppression of the Euboean Revolt. Sommerstein’s interpretation aligns with the assessment of the revolt found in Xenophon’s Hellenica. Here, the Histiaeans are prominently featured among the numerous grievances attributed to the Athenians, alongside the Melians, Scionaeans, Toronaeans, Aeginetans and many other Greek states. Of all these, the Athenians particularly feared retribution in 405, shortly before their defeat.Footnote 81 By drawing a parallel between the Persians’ sack of Eretria and Athens’ subsequent oppressive response to the Euboean Revolt, Herodotus effectively mirrors Athenian imperialism. Now the question arises as to what circumstances led him to describe his Persians as enacting the script of Athenian imperialism.

The absence of Thucydides’ account regarding the end of the Peloponnesian War has, as Irwin aptly posits, led scholars to overlook the prevailing sentiment among the Athenians during this period as a potential context for Herodotus’ work.Footnote 82 This period marked a pivotal recognition of their past imperialism as a transgression. After the Lacedaemonians ultimately chose to spare Athens at the end of the war, a novel retrospective view began to permeate Athenian thought.Footnote 83 Xenophon’s Hellenica elucidates the Athenians’ increasing moral awareness regarding their past actions. Following their defeat at Aegospotami in 405, the Athenians perceived an impending suffering reminiscent of the treatment they had long inflicted upon various Greek city-states. This led them to realise the pain they had, in turn, orchestrated upon others.Footnote 84

Given the likely late date of the Histories’ composition, Herodotus could have exhibited notable audacity in elucidating the repercussions of Athens’ imperialism at a juncture when her power was evidently in decline. The sentiment of his time likely demanded a more measured response to the Athenians’ newfound awareness of their past, rather than direct allusions, as it prompted a reflection on their imperial legacy through a historical lens. In the Histories, the Achaemenid Empire and Athens become subjects of the typical Herodotean judgment on imperialism, which, in his eyes, invariably leads to setbacks and punitive repercussions, ultimately provoking the diminishment of grand empires and cities as a form of divine retribution.Footnote 85 In Herodotus’ narrative world, retribution for Darius’ campaign against Greece comes in the form of failing to realize universalism, which ultimately undermines his ideological claims.Footnote 86 The Athenians also faced retribution by losing their empire, which they ruled as a ‘tyrant city’. This theme is likewise present in Thucydides’ account of Athenian politics.Footnote 87 The Athenian sentiment at war’s end, therefore, led Herodotus to position the Athenians alongside other significant figures in the Histories, such as Croesus and the Great Kings. All of them learnt bitterly that expansion inevitably leads to setbacks. To this end, the First Persian War served not only as a fitting subject for conveying a message to the Athenians but also as a stage upon which the effects of imperialism could be starkly reflected. Ultimately, it was Athenian imperialism that undermined the liberty of Greece that the Athenians had so proudly claimed to defend against the Persians at Marathon.Footnote 88

V. CONCLUSION

From this reading of Herodotus’ account of the First Persian War, a nuanced understanding of its embedded political message emerges. Rather than simply recounting historical events, his account invites readers to critically evaluate their circumstances, thereby guiding them toward an interpretation of Persian imperialism as a reflection of Athenian policies. Modern historians must approach the Histories with circumspection when seeking to reconstruct the events that transpired. Herodotus manipulated prevailing narratives by shifting the contexts in which the Persians employed their methods of conquest to convey a political message to an audience that had witnessed the end of the Peloponnesian War. It is crucial, though, to approach this interpretation with a degree of caution. The message underlying the account of the First Persian War does not extend across the entirety of the Histories. Herodotus’ account of Xerxes’ campaign operates on a different level, as it encompasses nearly the entire Greek world and consequently invites a different interpretation. The examination of its underlying political message, however, exceeds the scope of the present article.

Footnotes

*

I thank Professors Reinhold Bichler and Robert Rollinger for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and CQ’s reader for invaluable suggestions. Translations of Herodotus are those of A.D. Godley, published in the Loeb series. The ‘Royal Inscriptions of the Neo-Assyrian Period’ (RINAP) are available online via https://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/riao/corpus/. All ancient dates are, unless otherwise noted, before the Common Era. Parts of this research were funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Cluster of Excellence “Eurasian Transformations” [Grant-DOI: 10.55776/COE8].

References

1 J. Moles, ‘Herodotus and Athens’, in E. Bakker, I.J.F. de Jong and H. van Wees (edd.), Brill’s Companion to Herodotus (Leiden, 2002), 33–52, at 34 n. 12; J. Cobet, ‘Wann wurde Herodots Darstellung der Perserkriege publiziert?’, Hermes 105 (1977), 2–27, providing overviews of passages in the Histories that may relate to events in the Pentecontaetia and relevant literature.

2 E.g. E. Irwin, ‘Herodotus and Samos. Personal or political?’, CW 102 (2009), 371–92; K. Ruffing, ‘Westwards bound … the Achaemenid Empire and the Mediterranean’, in T. Daryaee and R. Rollinger (edd.), Iran and its Histories. From the Beginnings through the Achaemenid Empire (Wiesbaden, 2021), 348–67. They argue that the Achaemenid expansion into the Aegean, as presented by Herodotus, represents Athenian imperialism in disguise.

3 E. Irwin, ‘The end of the Histories and the end of the Atheno-Peloponnesian Wars’, in T. Harrison and E. Irwin (edd.), Interpreting Herodotus (Oxford, 2018), 279–334, at 281–2 provides an overview with bibliography.

4 E.g. G. Cawkwell, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia (Oxford, 2005); J.F. Lazenby, The Defence of Greece, 490–479 B.C. (Warminster, 1993); R. Schulz, ‘Zwischen Eroberungskrieg und Präventivschlag? Neue Perspektiven zu den Perserkriegen und ihren Voraussetzungen’, HZ 306 (2018), 647–84.

5 H. Strasburger, ‘Herodot und das perikleische Athen’, Historia 5 (1955), 1–25 broke with the prevailing scholarly view of his time by arguing that Herodotus was not writing a pro-Athenian account. Yet modern commentators are divided into two camps regarding Herodotus’ view of Athens, with many still favouring the idea that he took a pro-Athenian stance: e.g. W.G. Forrest, ‘Herodotos and Athens’, Phoenix 38 (1984), 1–11, at 10 (‘Herodotos was enarmoured of Athens; of course he was’). Most specialists, however, see Herodotus as a writer who criticizes the politics of Athens during his time. See, for example, Moles (n. 1), 40–2; H.R. Fowler, ‘Herodotus and Athens’, in P. Derow and R. Parker (edd.), Herodotus and His World. Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest (Oxford, 2003), 305–18; J. Grethlein, ‘The dynamics of time: Herodotus’ Histories and contemporary Athens before and after Fornara’, in T. Harris and E. Irwin (edd.), Interpreting Herodotus (Oxford, 2018), 223–42; Irwin (n. 3); K. Raaflaub, ‘Herodot und Thukydides: Persischer Imperialismus im Lichte der athenischen Sizilienpolitik’, in N. Ehrhardt and L.-M. Günther (edd.), Widerstand – Anpassung – Integration: Die griechische Staatenwelt und Rom (Stuttgart, 2002), 11–40.

6 N. Luraghi, ‘Reading Herodotus during the Archidamian War’, QUCC 118 (2018), 11–44, at 33–40.

7 See E. Irwin, ‘Date of composition’, in C. Baron (ed.), The Herodotus Encyclopaedia (Hoboken, NJ, 2021), 409–12 for an overview of the debate concerning the date of composition. E. Irwin, ‘“The hybris of Theseus” and the date of the Histories’, in B. Dunsch and K. Ruffing (edd.), Herodots Quellen – Die Quellen Herodots (Wiesbaden, 2013), 7–84 suggests that Herodotus hints at events at the end of the Peloponnesian War. This new dating is, however, based on a school of thought most prominently represented by C.W. Fornara, which argues that Herodotus’ work was published at the close of the Peloponnesian War. E.g. C.W. Fornara, ‘Evidence for the date of Herodotus’ publication’, JHS 91 (1971), 25–34, at 34 on Hdt. 9.73.3.

8 E.g. I.J.F. de Jong, ‘Herodotus’ handling of (narratological) time in the Thermopylae passage’, in L.W. van Gils, I.J.F. de Jong and C.H.M. Kroon (edd.), Textual Strategies in Ancient War Narrative: Thermopylae, Cannae and Beyond (Leiden and Boston, 2019), 113–30, at 128; O. Murray, ‘Herodotus and oral history reconsidered’, in N. Luraghi (ed.), The Historian’s Craft in the Age of Herodotus (Oxford and New York, 2001), 314–25, at 322.

9 See J. Degen, ‘Xerxes I, an heir of Assyria? The Daiva inscription in context’, JNES 83 (2024), 41–58; C. Matarese, Deportationen im Perserreich in teispidisch-achaimenidischer Zeit (Wiesbaden, 2021) (deportations in the Teispid-Achaemenid Empire); B. Oded, Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian Empire (Wiesbaden, 1979) (deportations in the Neo-Assyrian); K. Raaflaub, ‘Learning from the enemy. Athenian and Persian instruments of Empire’, in J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas and R. Parker (edd.), Interpreting the Athenian Empire (London, 2009), 89–124 (Athenian Empire); K. Radner, ‘High visibility punishment and deterrent: impalement in Assyrian warfare and legal practice’, Zeitschrift für altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte 21 (2015), 103–28 (punishment in the Neo-Assyrian Empire).

10 For instance, Raaflaub (n. 9), 124 observed parallels between Athenian and Persian methods of imperialism and raised questions regarding their historical accuracy, particularly as to whether Athens adopted imperial strategies. Cf. K. Ruffing, ‘Die ‘Satrapienliste’ des Dareios: Herodoteisches Konstrukt oder Realität?’, Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran und Turan 41 (2009), 323–39 (allusions); contra Luraghi (n. 6), 37.

11 Hdt. 6.94.

12 N. Kramer, ‘Athen – keine Stadt des Grosskönigs!’, Hermes 132 (2004), 257–70 has argued that Athens never came under Persian authority. Seen from the perspective of the Great King, Athens was part of his empire, as M. Waters, ‘Xerxes and the oath-breakers: empire and rebellion on the northwestern front’, in J.J. Collins and J.G. Manning (edd.), Revolt and Resistance in the Ancient Classical World and the Near East in the Crucible of Empire (Leiden, 2016), 93–102 and D. Beckman, ‘King Artaxerxes’ Aegean policy’, Journal of Persianate Studies 10 (2017), 1–25 have put it.

13 Degen (n. 9), 46; Waters (n. 12), 101–2.

14 Hdt. 5.99.

15 Hdt. 5.101–2.

16 Degen (n. 9), 50–1.

17 Hdt. 6.94. On the demand of ‘earth and water’ being an act of subjugation in the Great King’s eyes, see E. Rung, ‘The language of the Achaemenid imperial diplomacy towards the Greeks: the meaning of Earth and Water’, Klio 97 (2015), 503–15.

18 Hdt. 5.98–101.

19 Hdt. 6.101.3.

20 Hdt. 6.102–16.

21 Hdt. 6.118.

22 Hdt. 6.119.

23 Thuc. 1.116.

24 K.L. Gaca, ‘The andrapodizing of war captives in Greek historical memory’, TAPhA 140 (2010), 117–61.

25 Hdt. 6.94 ἐξανδραποδίσαντας … ἐς ὄψιν τὰ ἀνδράποδα; 6.101.3 ἠνδραποδίσαντο κατὰ τὰς Δαρείου ἐντολάς.

26 J.E. Powell, A Lexicon to Herodotus (Cambridge, 1938), 25: Hdt. 1.156.1 (Croesus fears that the Persians will enslave the Lydians); 3.137.3 (Persians are threatening the Crotoniats by asking them which city Darius will enslave); 6.18 (Persians enslave Miletus); 6.17 (Dionysius the Phocaean knows that the Persians will enslave Phocaea along with the rest of Ionia); 6.106.2 (Athenians fear enslavement by the Persians); 3.147.1 (Otanes forgets about Darius’ order not to enslave the Samians); 4.203.1; 204 (Persians enslave the Barcaeans); 5.27.2 (being installed by the Persians, Lycaretus tries to enslave the inhabitants of Lemnos, accusing them of plundering the army of Darius); 6.96 (Persians enslave the Naxians); 6.101.3 (Persians enslave the Eretrians); 6.119 (Persians bring the enslaved Eretrians to Darius); 8.29.2 (Thessalians state that they can decide whom the Persians will enslave). There are only three instances of people who are not Persians enslaving people: 1.76.2 (Croesus enslave the city of the Pterians); 1.151.2 (Methymna enslaves Arisba); 3.59.3 (Aeginetans and Cretans enslave the Samians).

27 See Anonymous, Lexicon Thucydidaeum: A Dictionary, in Greek and English, of the Words, Phrases, and Principal Idioms, Contained in the History of the Peloponnesian War of Thucydides (Oxford and Cambridge, 1824), 23. Athenians wielding of ἀνδραποδίζω in Thuc. 1.98; 113; 2.68.7 (Amphilochians, Acarnanians with the help of Athens); 3.28; 36.2; 4.48.4; 5.3.4; 6.32; 62.3; 5.9.9. Note the exception of Thuc. 3.68.2, where it is said that the Spartans enslaved and killed Plataeans.

28 Philostr. V A 1.23 σαγηνευθῆναι; Plat. Leg. 698d σαγηνεύσαιεν; Menex. 240b–c; Strab. 10.1.10: σαγηνεύσαντες. See LSJ s.v. σαγηνεύω: ‘surround and take fish with a drag-net (σαγήνη) … sweep the whole population off the face of a country by forming a line and marching over it, a Persian practice’.

29 Hdt. 3.149.1; 6.31; Strabo (10.1.10) even attributes the description of the method of netting to Herodotus (σαγηνεύσαντες, ὥς φησιν Ἡρόδοτος).

30 Hdt. 3.142–9 (Samos); 6.31 (Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos, as well as Ionian cities possibly after the Ionian Revolt).

31 Hdt. 5.106. The Great King considered all political entities that do not obey his orders as rebels due to a universalistic worldview: Degen (n. 9), 44.

32 It remains unclear which account Plato, Strabo and Philostratus used as a source to describe the sack of Eretria. F. Grosso, ‘Gli Eretriesi deportati in Persia’, RFIC 36 (1958), 350–75 suggests that Apollonius followed Ctesias. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether or not Ctesias mentioned the method of netting, as his account survived only in fragments.

33 P. Ceccarelli, ‘La fable des poissons de Cyrus (Hérodote, I, 141). Son origine et sa fonction dans l’économie des Histoires d’Hérodote’, Mètis 8 (1993), 29–57, at 39–42; S.W. Hirsch, ‘Cyrus’ parable of the fish: sea power in the early relations of Greece and Persia’, CJ 81 (1985), 222–9, at 223–4.

34 L. Scott, Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6 (Leiden and Boston, 2005), 155; R.B. Strassler (ed.), The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories (London, 2007), 257. Ethnographical comparison: D. Asheri, A. Lloyd and A. Corcella, A Commentary on Herodotus Books I–IV (Oxford, 2007), 521; W.W. How and J. Welles, A Commentary on Herodotus (Oxford and New York, 1989), ad loc.

35 M. Lang and R. Rollinger, ‘Im Herzen der Meere und in der Mitte des Meeres. Das Buch Ezechiel und die in assyrischer Zeit fassbaren Vorstellungen von den Grenzen der Welt’, in R. Rollinger et al. (edd.), Interkulturalität in der Alten Welt (Wiesbaden, 2010), 207–64, at 216–54.

36 R. Rollinger, ‘Assyria and the far west: the Aegean world’, in E. Frahm (ed.), A Companion to Assyria (Malden, MA, 2017), 275–85, at 275–6, 278–9.

37 Lang and Rollinger (n. 35), 250–3; H. Tadmor, ‘World domination. The expanding horizon of the Assyrian empire’, in L. Milano et al. (edd.), Landscapes. Territories, Frontiers and Horizons in the Ancient Near East (Padua, 1999), 55–62.

38 Enemies fleeing from the Assyrian king like fish to the midst of the sea or being caught by him with a net like they were fish. Sargon II, RINAP 2 no. 13 lines 35; 56; no. 43 line 21; no. 64 line 13; no. 65 lines 20; 201; no. 87 l. 17. Sennacherib, RINAP 3/2 no. 45 line 3. Esarhaddon, RINAP 4 no. 1 col. ii line 73; no. 2 col. i line 22; col. iii line 39; no. 6 col. ii line 18. Ashurbanipal, RINAP 5/1 no. 9 col. iii line 69; RINAP 5/2 no. 207 r. line 34; no. 234 o. col. ii line 10. The widespread understanding of the metaphor of the royal fisher among the elites can be inferred from a letter written by the Assyrian general Bēl-ibni, who served under Assurbanipal. See ABL 1102 lines 1–9 in J.M.C.T. De Vaan, ‘Ich bin eine Schwertklinge des Königs’. Die Sprache des Bēl-ibni (Münster, 1995), 298–9.

39 The Achaemenids inherited the Assyrian imperial legacy in manifold ways. See Degen (n. 9), 47–54 (cosmic order); J. Haubold, ‘The Achaemenid empire and the sea’, MHR 27 (2012), 4–23, at 5–13 (geographical concepts); R. Rollinger, ‘The relief at Bisitun and its ancient Near Eastern setting: contextualizing the visual vocabulary of Darius᾽ triumph over Gaumata’, in A. Luther et al. (edd.), Diwan. Untersuchungen zu Geschichte und Kultur des Nahen Ostens und des östlichen Mittelmeerraumes im Altertum (Duisburg, 2016), 5–51 (iconography); F. Pompeo, ‘“To lie” between myth and history: some remarks on the meaning of the Old Persian Verb duruj- in the light of Avestan mythology’, in P. Cotticelli-Kurras and V. Sadovski (edd.), The Ritual Sphere in Cultic Texts and Practices from the Ancient and Early Medieval East (Oslo, 2020), 99–124 (lie and truth as political concepts).

40 Hdt. 1.27.

41 Hdt. 1.160.

42 Hdt 1.169.

43 Hdt. 3.19, 34.4. See Haubold (n. 39), 7.

44 Hdt. 3.96.

45 Hdt. 3.120–2, 5.106, 108, 6.2.

46 Moreover, the circumstances under which the Achaemenids employed deportation as a policy did not align with those pertaining to the Eretrians. Typically, only rebels who had previously been subject to the Great King’s rule were deported subsequent to the imperial army’s suppression of their rebellion, with economic considerations also playing a role: Matarese (n. 9), 201–28.

47 See Hdt. 1.87 (Cyrus spares Croesus, whom he previously had set on the pyre); 3.34–6 (Cambyses praises Croesus before he attempts to kill him); 7.29; 39 (Xerxes gives precious presents to Pythius before killing his son); 8.118.4 (Xerxes gives a golden crow to the pilot who saved his life before cutting off his head).

48 See the overview of the debate in S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides: Volume I: Books I–III (Oxford, 1997), 244–5. See also R. Bichler, ‘General Datis’ death in the battle of Marathon. A commentary on Ctesias of Cnidus and his relation to Herodotus’, in R. Rollinger and K. Ruffing (edd.), Reinhold Bichler. Historiographie – Ethnographie – Utopie. Gesammelte Schriften, Teil 4 (Wiesbaden, 2016), 67–81, at 70, arguing for Herodotus’ deliberately drawing a parallel to his own time.

49 Hdt. 6.98.1–2.

50 Thuc. 2.8.

51 Fornara (n. 7), 32 on Hdt. 6.98.1–2: ‘Herodotus’ words are like the statement of a man who looks at the sky after the storm clouds have been swept from it.’

52 Hdt. 6.95–100.

53 Datis, according to the Lindian Temple Chronicle (FGrHist 532 F 51), besieged Lindos and performed rich sacrifices there, an event that is not mentioned in the Histories. See J.M. Bigwood, ‘Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars’, Phoenix 32 (1978), 19–41, 22 n. 12; C. Higbie, The Lindian Chronicle and the Greek Creation of Their Past (Oxford, 2003), 122 with critical remarks concerning the context of Datis’ siege.

54 Hdt. 6.96.

55 See Scott (n. 34), 342 on FGrHist 105 F 3 (= Plut. De Her. mal. 869B) as well as on Hdt. 8.46.3; FGrHist 70 F 187 and FGrHist 4 F 183 (= Plut. De Her. mal. 869A).

56 Thuc. 1.98.4. See R. Bichler, Herodots Welt. Der Aufbau der Historie am Bild der fremden Länder und Völker, ihrer Zivilisation und ihrer Geschichte (Berlin, 20012), 303–4.

57 Thuc. 1.98.3. See Hornblower (n. 48), 151 (his italics): ‘The incorporation of the Karystians is perhaps mentioned as the first of a category, allies forcibly brought into the league, just as Naxos is the first to be reduced after rebellion.’

58 Hdt. 6.99.2.

59 Hdt. 6.97.

60 Hdt. 6.118.2–3.

61 Scott (n. 34), 344. Using local cults to gain legitimation is not an isolated case of an Achaemenid method of empire. See J. Haubold, ‘Xerxes’ Homer’, in E. Bridges et al. (edd.), Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium (Oxford, 2010), 47–64 on Xerxes at Troy as an example of Persians attempting to gain acceptance for their rule by venerating local cults during military campaigns. See also P. Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire (Winona Lake, IN, 2002), 159 (‘Datis’s expedition was also a sort of propaganda tour’); H.W. Parke, ‘Polycrates and Delos’, CQ 40 (1946), 105–8, at 108 (‘in the proper tradition of those who intervene in the Cyclades’); G. Bonnin, ‘Delos’, in C. Baron (ed.), The Herodotus Encyclopaedia (Hoboken, NJ, 2021), 427–8, at 428 (Persians regarded the Delian gods as their own); contra Scott (n. 34), 344.

62 Thuc. 5.1; 32.1. See A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K.J. Dover, An Historical Commentary on Thucydides Volume 4. Books V(25)–VII (Oxford, 1970), 30, arguing that the Athenians were moved by superstition. For a different interpretation see Diod. Sic. 12.73.1 with the comments of R. Parker, ‘Greek states and Greek oracles’, HPTh 6 (1985), 298–326, at 308.

63 Thuc. 1.13.6; 3.104.2.

64 See Scott (n. 34), 345.

65 Thuc. 3.104.

66 Aristot. [Ath. Pol.] 54; Dem. 4.34. See P. Stengel, ‘Delia 3’, RE IV.2 (1901), 2433–5, at 2433: ‘so stellte Athen durch die Sendung des heiligen Schiffes, eines Chores und eines grossartigen Opfers alle übrigen doch so in den Schatten, dass man das Fest fast ein athenisches nennen darf’.

67 Hdt. 1.131–2. Datis was a Mede (Hdt. 6.94.2). Nevertheless, Herodotus does not describe the customs of the Medes but only those of the Persians. The Medes and the Persians appear to share the same ethnic customs in the world of the Histories. Despite that, the Persians in Datis’ army would not have welcomed him, sacrificing in a way that went against their customs. On νόμος as a guiding principle in Herodotus’ description of cultural customs see K. Scarlett Kingsley, ‘Justifying violence in Herodotus’ Histories 3.38: nomos, king of all, and Pindaric poetics’, in E. Bowie (ed.), Herodotus: Narrator, Scientist, Historian (Berlin and Boston, 2018), 37–58.

68 Thuc. 4.97.3.

69 Bichler (n. 48), 70.

70 Ruffing (n. 2), 357–8.

71 Plut. Per. 23.2. Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F 387) indicates that some Euboeans were expelled to Macedonia. Euboean elites were called ἱπποβόται, according to Strabo, following Aristotle (Strab. 10.1.8).

72 Hdt. 5.77.2–3; 99–100.

73 D.M. Lewis, ‘Mainland Greece, 479–451 B.C.’, in D.M. Lewis et al. (edd.), The Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition. Volume V: The Fifth Century (Cambridge, 19922), 96–170, at 133–4; M.C. Taylor, Thucydides, Pericles, and the Idea of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (Cambridge, 2010), 37.

74 Raaflaub (n. 9), 96; 110 with bibliography. Thuc. 1.114.3 omits the term ‘cleruchs’, but epigraphical evidence suggests that the Athenian settlers mentioned were such. See Hornblower (n. 48), 186.

75 Hdt. 5.77; 6.100.

76 Thuc. 8.96.

77 M. Ostwald, ‘Athens and Chalkis: a study in imperial control’, JHS 122 (2002), 134–43, at 135–7; S.D. Lambert, ‘Two inscribed documents of the Athenian empire. The Chalkis decree and the tribute reassessment decree’, Attic Inscriptions Online Papers 8 (2017), 1–43, at 15–16; H.B. Mattingly, ‘Athens and Euboea’, JHS 81 (1961), 124–32, at 131; C.D. Morris, ‘On a probable error in Plutarch’, AJPh 312 (1882), 456–60, at 458–60 (Plutarch confused the two expeditions); Ruffing (n. 2), 358 (‘Herodotus’ interest in the Persian campaign on Euboea is fired by the Athenian actions on the island under Pericles’ command’); Scott (n. 34), 352.

78 Diod. Sic. 12.7.1; Plut. Per. 7.6; 23.2.

79 Ar. Nub. 213.

80 A.H. Sommerstein, The Comedies of Aristophanes, Vol 3: Clouds (Warminster, 19912), 171.

81 V. Azoulay, Pericles of Athens (Princeton and Oxford, 2014), 57–8 on Xen. Hell. 2.2.3.

82 E. Irwin, ‘The Histories in context: some reflections on publication, reception, and interpretation’, in J. Degen et al. (edd.), Ancient Worlds in Perspective. Contextualizing Herodotus (Wiesbaden, 2024), 17–49, at 31–2; 39; Irwin (n. 3), 289.

83 Xen. Hell. 2.3.41.

84 Xen. Hell. 2.2.3; 10. See Irwin (n. 3), 290.

85 Hdt. 1.5, 6.86α, 7.18, 7.46. See Bichler (n. 56), especially 377–83; also R. Xian, ‘The Cyrus anecdote in Herodotus 9.122’, CQ 70 (2020), 16–26 and K. Ruffing, ‘Alloisi douleuein und der Rat des Artembares. Überlegungen zum Schlußkapitel in Herodots Historien’, in A. Luther et al. (edd.), Diwan. Untersuchungen zu Geschichte und Kultur des Nahen Ostens und des östlichen Mittelmeerraumes im Altertum (Duisburg, 2016), 183–203, who view the last chapter of the Histories as a moral lesson.

86 Herodotus’ Darius asserts and claims to rule both Asia and Europe: Hdt. 1.209, 4.143, 6.94. As an idea pivotal to the Achaemenids, universalism is challenged by Herodotus through playful responses to this idea in parts of his account where profound meaning is inherited into his overall narrative. See T. Harrison, ‘Herodotus on the character of Persian imperialism’, in A. Fitzpatrick-McKinley (ed.) Assessing Biblical and Classical Sources for the Reconstruction of Persian Influence, History and Culture (Wiesbaden, 2014), 9–48; R. Rollinger, ‘Herodotus and empire: Near Eastern monuments and their cultural recycling in Herodotus’s Histories’, in J. Ben-Dov and F. Rojas (edd.), Afterlives of Ancient Rock-cut Monuments in the Near East: Carvings in and out of Time (Leiden and Boston, 2021), 186–220, at 205–7.

87 K. Raaflaub, ‘Herodotus’ political thought and the meaning of history’, in D. Boedeker and J. Peradotto (edd.), Herodotus and the Invention of History (Buffalo, 1987), 221–48, at 224; P. Stadter, ‘Herodotus and the Athenian archē’, ASNP 22 (1992), 781–809. On Athens portrayed as ‘tyrant city’ in the Histories, see J. Degen, ‘Planets, palaces and empire. Herodotus on Deioces and Ecbatana (Hdt. 1.98–99)’, in R. Mattila et al. (edd.), Evidence Combined: Western and Eastern Sources in Dialogue (Vienna, 2022), 49–81, at 55; 68–9 on Hdt. 1.98.3–6.

88 Thuc. 1.73.4. E.g. M. Zahrnt, ‘Marathon, the century after’, in K. Buraselis and E. Koulakiotis (edd.), Marathon the Day After (Athens, 2013), 139–50. See also K. Raaflaub, ‘Philosophy, science, politics: Herodotus and the intellectual trends of his time’, in E.J. Bakker, I.J.F. de Jong and H. van Wees (edd.), Brill’s Companion to Herodotus (Leiden and Boston, 2002), 149–86, at 184: ‘Herodotus no less than Thucydides sees history dominated by the antithetical desires for liberty and power.’