The conventional literature suggests that the Chinese party-state has further strengthened social control and reinforced stability maintenance through expanded grassroots delegation. However, drawing on fieldwork interviews, government reports and media coverage, this article demonstrates that initiatives aimed at delegating power may actually weaken the government’s substantive responsiveness, thereby hindering the everyday management of disputes. The inherent tension of decentralization within a centralized political system leads to an uneven distribution of incentives and resources among agents at various levels. While more logistical powers (such as surveillance and mundane daily services) are allocated to grassroots governments, most decision-making and coercive powers (law enforcement and court rulings) remain in the hands of district-level functional departments. Grassroots officials are increasingly required to take broad responsibility for resolving citizen complaints, yet they face significant obstacles in mobilizing the relevant functional departments to address these issues. The reduced efficiency of problem-solving at the grassroots level not only increases the burden on grassroots bureaucrats to appease aggrieved citizens but also diminishes the effectiveness of initial efforts to contain routine grievances and prevent their escalation. This poses greater challenges for higher-level governments in balancing control and inclusivity, as well as in maintaining the legitimacy of state-sanctioned participatory institutions and the regime.

摘要

传统的观点认为, 中国政府通过扩大基层分权进一步加强了社会控制。然而, 本文基于实地访谈、政府报告和媒体报道发现, 权力下放的举措可能反而会削弱政府的实质性回应能力, 从而阻碍日常的纠纷治理。在中央集权的政治体制下, 权力下放的内在矛盾会导致激励和资源在各层级代理人之间分配不均衡。具体而言, 更多的后勤权力 (如监控和日常服务) 下放给了基层政府, 而大部分决策权和强制权 (如执法和法院判决) 仍掌握在区级职能部门手中。然而, 基层官员越来越需要对纠纷化解承担兜底责任, 但在动员有相应能力的职能部门解决问题时, 却面临着重重障碍。基层解决问题的效率降低, 不仅加重了基层一线官僚安抚不满民众的负担, 也使得在初期阶段遏制日常纠纷的效果大打折扣。这有可能给上级政府在平衡控制与包容、维护公众参与制度功能和政权合法性方面带来更多挑战。