Hostname: page-component-7dd5485656-kp629 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-31T04:02:43.772Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Williamson on Fine on Prior on the reduction of possibilist discourse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kit Fine
Kit Fine*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY, USA
*
Email: kit.fine@nyu.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I attempt to meet some criticisms that Williamson makes of my attempt to carry out Prior's project of reducing possibility discourse to actualist discourse.

Keywords

Modality

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 548 - 570
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Boeten, J. C. M. 2005. “A Brief History of Process Algebra.” Theoretical Computer Science 335: 131–146. 10.1016/j.tcs.2004.07.036CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 1977a. Prior on the Construction of Possible Worlds and Instants. in Prior and Fine 1977b, 116–168’; reprinted as chapter 4 of Fine (2005a).Google Scholar
Fine, K. 1977b. “‘Properties, Propositions and Sets.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 6: 135–191. 10.1007/BF00262054CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 1981. “Model Theory for Modal Logic, Part III: Existence and Predication.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 10: 293–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 2002. The Problem of Possibilia, in Loux and Zimmerman (2002), 161–179; reprinted as chapter 6 of Fine (2005a).Google Scholar
Fine, K. 2005a. Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0199278709.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 2005b. “Class and Membership.” Journal of Philosophy 102: 547–572. 10.5840/jphil2005102118CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fine, K. 2006. “Relatively Unrestricted Quantification.” In Chapter 1 of ‘Absolute Generality’, edited by Rayo, A. and Uzquiano, G., 20–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fine, K. 2009. “The Question of Ontology.” In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by Chalmers, D., Manley, D., and Wassermann, R., 157–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fritz, P., and Goodman, J.. 2014. Counting Incompossibles, unpublished draft.Google Scholar
Harel, D. 1984. “Dynamic Logic.” In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume II: Extensions of Classical Logic, edited by Gabbay, D. and Guenthner, F., chapter 10, 497–604. Dordrecht: Reidel. 10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. 1963. “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.” Acta Philosophica Fennica 16: 83–94; reprinted in ‘Reference and Modality’ (ed. L. Linsky), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.Google Scholar
Leuenberger, S. 2006. “A New Problem of Descriptive Power.” Journal of Philosophy 103(3): 145–159. 10.5840/jphil2006103334CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loux, M., and Zimmerman, D., eds. 2002. The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Prior, A. N., and Fine, K.. 1977. Worlds, times and Selves. London: Duckworth; chapter 6 of Fine (2005a).Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2002. “The Ersatz Pluriverse.” Journal of Philosophy 99: 279–315. 10.2307/3655585CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552078.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar