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The verdictive organization of desire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Derek Baker
Derek Baker*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
*
E-mail: derekbaker@ln.edu.hk
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Abstract

Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.

Keywords

Desirespractical reasonpractical rationalityself-knowledgeHumean theory of reasons

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 5 , 2017 , pp. 589 - 612
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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