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Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Uriah Kriegel
Uriah Kriegel*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA
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Extract

John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call causal token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non-perceptual) experiences, which I will call temporal token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , December 2009 , pp. 585 - 617
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2009

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