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The reversal test, status quo bias, and opposition to human cognitive enhancement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Steve Clarke
Steve Clarke*
Affiliation:
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
*
Email: stclarke@csu.edu.au
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Abstract

Bostrom and Ord’s reversal test has been appealed to by many philosophers to substantiate the charge that preferences for status quo options are motivated by status quo bias. I argue that their characterization of the reversal test needs to be modified, and that their description of the burden of proof it imposes needs to be clarified. I then argue that there is a way to meet that burden of proof which Bostrom and Ord fail to recognize. I also argue that the range of circumstances in which the reversal test can be usefully applied is narrower than they recognize.

Keywords

Argument from riskbackfiringburden of proofhuman cognitive enhancementreversal teststatus quo bias

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , June 2016 , pp. 369 - 386
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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