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Prenatal Injury and the Nonidentity Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2021

Michael Rabenberg
Michael Rabenberg*
Affiliation:
University Center for Human Values, Princeton University. Princeton, NJ, USA
*
Email: rabenbergm@gmail.com
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Abstract

I argue that, given certain prominent views of personal identity and prudence, the nonidentity problem, or a very similar problem, can arise postconception. I clarify and defend this claim by considering the implications of these views for prenatal injury.

Keywords

Ethicsapplied ethicsbioethicsprenatal injurynonidentity problempersonal identity

Information

Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 2 , February 2021 , pp. 123 - 142
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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