Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-5kfdg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-09-06T03:37:25.947Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On “Should I Be Moral?” — A Reply to Snare

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Michael S. Pritchard
Michael S. Pritchard*
Affiliation:
Western Michigan University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'

Information

Type
Reply
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , March 1976 , pp. 121 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1976

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

1 Frank, Snare “Can a Moral Man Raise the Question, ‘Should I be Moral?’”, Canadian journal of Philosophy, IV (1974-5), pp. 498–507.Google Scholar

2 Premise (2) assumes a reasonably clear distinction can be made between moral and non-moral reasons. Snare does not attempt to explain the distinction; nor will I. Insofar as there is some doubt that such a distinction can be made, doubt is cast on Snare's claim that non-moral reasons are more fundamental than moral reasons in certain contexts. My position is that even if such a distinction can be made, Snare has failed to show that non-moral reasons are in any sense more fundamental than moral reasons.