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The Objective Confirmation of Hypotheses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Nathan Stemmer
Nathan Stemmer*
Affiliation:
Bar-llan University
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Extract

According to Nicod's criterion of confirmation ([7]), a hypothesis of the form ‘All P are Q’ is confirmed by its positive instances, i.e. by entities that are P and Q. It is well known, however, that the criterion gives origin to counterintuitive results. For example, it sanctions the confirmation of ‘All nonblacks are nonravens’ by a nonblack nonraven. Since this hypothesis is logically equivalent to ‘All ravens are black,’ it follows that the criterion indirectly sanctions the counterintuitive confirmation of ‘All ravens are black’ by a non black nonraven, e.g. by a white shoe.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 1981 , pp. 395 - 404
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1981

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