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The modal view of essence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sam Cowling
Sam Cowling*
Affiliation:
aDepartment of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, OH, 43023, USA
*
E-mail: samcowling@gmail.com
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Abstract

According to the modal view, essence admits of reductive analysis in exclusively modal terms. Fine (1994) argues that modal view delivers an inadequate analysis of essence. This paper defends the modal view from Fine's challenge. This defense proceeds by examining the disagreement between Finean primitivists and Quinean eliminativists about essence. In order to model this disagreement, a distinction between essence and a separable concept, nature, is required. This distinction is then used to show that Fine's challenge is misdirected and therefore unsuccessful.

Keywords

essencemodalityessentialism

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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , 2013 , pp. 248 - 266
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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