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Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Luca Moretti
Luca Moretti*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian Universität, Munich, Germany
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Abstract

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most developed view to this effect is Michael Huemer ’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Luca Moretti has recently shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.

Keywords

Inferential justificationinferential seemingsphenomenal conservatismreflective awarenessentitlement theoryMichael Huemer

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Articles
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , March 2019 , pp. 253 - 271
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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