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Essence in abundance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Alexander Skiles
Alexander Skiles*
Affiliation:
Institut de philosophie, Université de Neuchâtel, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
*
*Email: alexander.j.skiles@gmail.com
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Abstract

Fine (1994 “Essence and Modality”;, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16) is widely thought to have refuted the simple modal account of essence, which takes the essential properties of a thing to be those it cannot exist without exemplifying. Yet, a number of philosophers have suggested resuscitating the simple modal account by appealing to distinctions akin to the distinction Lewis (1983. “New Work For a Theory of Universals”;, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377; 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell) draws between sparse and abundant properties, treating only those in the former class as candidates for essentiality. I argue that ‘sparse modalism’ succumbs to counterexamples similar to those originally posed by Fine, and fails to capture paradigmatic instances of essence involving abundant properties and relations.

Keywords

essencemodalityessentialismsparse versus abundant propertiesKit FineDavid Lewis

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , February 2015 , pp. 100 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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