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Derivative culpability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Martin Montminy
Martin Montminy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA
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Abstract

I explore the question of when an agent is derivatively, rather than directly, culpable for an undesirable outcome. The undesirable outcome might be a harmful incompetent or unwitting act, or it might be a harmful event. By examining various cases, I develop a sophisticated account of indirect culpability that is neutral about controversies regarding normative ethical issues and the condition on direct culpability.

Keywords

Moral responsibilityindirect blameworthinessculpable ignorancecausation

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Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 5 , August 2019 , pp. 689 - 709
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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