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Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2019

Jens Christian Bjerring  and
Lars Bo Gundersen
Jens Christian Bjerring
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Aarhus University, Aarhus C, Denmark
Lars Bo Gundersen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Aarhus University, Aarhus C, Denmark
*
*Corresponding author. Email: fillg@cas.au.dk
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Abstract

It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

Keywords

Higher-order knowledgesensitivity theorytransmission principle for knowledgebelief-forming methods

Information

Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , April 2020 , pp. 339 - 349
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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