Hostname: page-component-54dcc4c588-dbm8p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-09-12T02:43:54.623Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sanford Goldberg
Sanford Goldberg*
Affiliation:
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0027, USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Externalism is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker's (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian's 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , March 2005 , pp. 135 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Audi, R. 1988. ‘Justification, Truth, and Reliability.’ Reprinted in Audi 1993.Google Scholar
Audi, R. 1993. The Structure of Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1989. ‘Content and Self-Knowledge.’ Philosophical Topics 17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1992. ‘Externalism and Inference,’ Philosophical Issues 2. 5–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boghossian, P. 1998. ‘What the externalist can know a priori,’ in C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bonjour, L. 1980. ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5. 53–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bonjour, L. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bonjour, L. and Sosa, E.. 2002. Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Brueckner, T. 1997. ‘Externalism and Memory.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78. 1–12.Google Scholar
Burge, T. 1988. ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge.’ Journal of Philosophy 85. 649–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burge, T. 1998. ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.’ In Martin, N. and Ludlow, P. eds., Externalism and Self-Knowledge Palo Alto: CSLI Press.Google Scholar
Burge, T. 2003. ‘Reply to Kobes,’ in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg, eds., Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. 1966/1989. Theory of Knowledge, 3rd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Gibbons, J. 1996: ‘Externalism and Knowledge of Content.’ Philosophical Review 105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ginet, C. 1975. Knowledge, Perception, and Memory Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, S. 1997. ‘Self-Ascription, Self-Knowledge, and the Memory Argument’ Analysis 57. 211–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. 1980. ‘The Internalist Conception of Justification’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5. 27–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. 1999. ‘Internalism Exposed’ The Journal of Philosophy 96. 271–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ludlow, P. 1995. ‘Social Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Memory’ Analysis 55. 157–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar