Hostname: page-component-68c7f8b79f-7wx25 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-12-29T02:48:22.279Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Moral Commitment and the Ethical Attorney

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Thomas M. Jones  and
Frederick H. Gautschi III
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The moral worth of attorneys has traditionally been judged in terms of compliance with legal codes of ethics. These codes, ostensibly designed to promote smooth and equitable functioning of an adversary system, are manifestations of a rule utilitarian moral system. This paper argues that ethical attorneys have a higher calling than rule compliance and that “moral commitment,” which combines commitment to “right” solutions and moral courage, is a superior yardstick for measuring their moral worth.

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 2 , Issue 4 , October 1992 , pp. 391 - 404
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Aronson, R. H., Devine, J. R., & Fisch, W. B. (1985). Problems, Cases and Materials in Professional Responsibility. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.Google Scholar
Blasi, A. (1980). “Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of the Literature.” Psychological Bulletin, 88: 1–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferren, J. M. (1978). “The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest.” The Business Lawyer, 33: 1253–1289.Google Scholar
Fiske, S. T. & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social Cognition. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Heffernan, W.C. (1986). “The Moral Accountability of Advocates.” Notre Dame Law Review, 61: 36–87.Google Scholar
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Jack, D. & Jack, R. (1988). “Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alternatives.” In Gilligan, C., Ward, J., and Taylor, J. (Eds.) Mapping the Moral Domain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Kelman, H. C. & Hamilton, V.L. (1989). Crimes of Obedience. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Kohlberg, L. (1976). “Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Development Approach.” In Lickona, T. (Ed.), Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues, (pp. 31–53). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.Google Scholar
Luban, D. (1988). Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Miller, J. M. (1989). “The Standards of Advocacy: Changing Positions in Legal Ethics in the United States.” Western State University Law Review, 16: 461–520.Google Scholar
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgment of the Child. Gabain, M., trans. New York: Free Press (translation 1965).Google Scholar
Rest, J. R. (1979). Development in Judging Moral Issues. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Rest, J. R. (1986). Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Rest, J. R. (1987). “Moral Judgment: An Interesting Variable for Higher Education Research.” Paper for the Annual Convention of the Association of Higher Education, Baltimore, Maryland, November 21, 1987.Google Scholar
Thoma, S. J. & Rest, J. R. (1986). “Moral Judgment, Behavior, Decision Making, and Attitudes.” In Rest, J. R. (Ed.), Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar