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The Physical Consequences of Fiscal Flexibility: Sovereign Credit and Physical Integrity Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2016

K. Chad Clay  and
Matthew R. Digiuseppe
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Abstract

Leaders are assumed to face fiscal constraints on their ability to remain in office by competitively distributing public and/or private goods. However, many leaders can relax this constraint by borrowing on sovereign credit markets. This article argues that states with the fiscal flexibility offered by favorable credit terms have the resources necessary to (1) respond to citizen demands with policies other than widespread repression and (2) avoid agency loss that may result in unauthorized repression by state agents. Empirical analyses indicate that creditworthy states have greater respect for physical integrity rights and are less likely to suffer diminished respect for those rights when facing violent dissent or negative shocks to government revenues.

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British Journal of Political Science , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 783 - 807
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© Cambridge University Press 2016 

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Footnotes

*

Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia (email: kcclay@uga.edu); Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi (email: mrdigius@olemiss.edu). Data replication sets are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS, and online appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123415000502.

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