If criticism, like charity, begins at home, both virtues are probably served bestby examining not the manifest faults, but the hidden ones. If Britain’sofficial position to-day is that a lead was given to the world and not followed,and that rearmament is a justified and overdue result, it is important to besure whether or not such is the historical truth. If it is, then the new Britishpolicy of 1939 can command the resolute and unreserved support of everyoneexcept a complete pacifist. But if it is not, then the new policy is unsound forlack of a moral certitude, and has none of the easy convenience ofunavoidability. And the matter can only be clarified by examining British policyin two ways—our record at key-points, and our greatest post-warachievements as judged by ourselves.

The first key-point occurred very early: in 1919. During the Peace Conference,Britain and the United States had agreed jointly (on June 28th) to strengthenthe League system by guaranteeing the territorial integrity of France, backed byforce. When the United States Government rejected the Covenant and withdrew fromthe guarantee, the British Government withdrew also, feeling unable to guaranteethe frontiers of France single-handed. But, six years later, we did giveprecisely such a guarantee, in the Treaty of Locarno. And there is real tragedyin the sequence of events. For, in virtue of the principle that a guarantor caninfluence the party guaranteed, we have been able since Locarno to influence andto moderate French policy. Had we given the guarantee in 1919 we should have hadthat power from the start.