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Disclosure for real humans

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 December 2019

LIONEL PAGE
LIONEL PAGE*
Affiliation:
University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
*
*Correspondence to: University of Technology Sydney – Economics, Sydney, New South Wales 2007, Australia. Email: lionel.page@uts.edu.au
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Abstract

Modern consumers typically face complex goods and services. In the interest of customer protection, these companies are asked to disclose information about the products and consumers are typically required to indicate their understanding of the information provided. In truth, consumers seldom consult, even less understand the information provided. I present here the state of evidence about how commercial disclosure actually works (or rather does not work) with consumers characterized with human limitations in information processing. I discuss ways to improve disclosure regulation to improve customer protection.

Information

Type
Article
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , April 2021 , pp. 225 - 237
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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