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Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2021

Stefanos A. Tsikas Open the ORCID record for Stefanos A. Tsikas [Opens in a new window]
Stefanos A. Tsikas*
Affiliation:
Hannover Medical School, Hannover, Germany
*
E-mail: tsikas.stefanos@mh-hannover.de
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Abstract

With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

Keywords

E62H26H30shamingframingtax avoidancesocial contagionpublic goods game
Type
Article
Information
Behavioural Public Policy , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , July 2023 , pp. 557 - 580
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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