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Spurious crisis versus sustainable science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2025

Christian H. Poth*
Affiliation:
Neuro-Cognitive Psychology, Department of Psychology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany c.poth@uni-bielefeld.de
Nina L. Poth
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy of Mind and Language, Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands ninalaura.poth@ru.nl
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

Here, we argue that Rosenholtz’ call for a paradigm shift in attention theory is unwarranted based on psychological evidence as well as philosophical theory and would disrupt scientific progress by preventing incremental science. To move forward, we suggest a different philosophical view on attention research that preserves the cumulative nature of scientific progress rather than waxing and waning theoretical paradigms.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Christian H. Poth and Nina L. Poth contributed equally.

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