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Self-deception: Adaptation or by-product?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Hugo Mercier
Hugo Mercier
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. hmercier@sas.upenn.edu http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/
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Abstract

By systematically biasing our beliefs, self-deception can endanger our ability to successfully convey our messages. It can also lead lies to degenerate into more severe damages in relationships. Accordingly, I suggest that the biases reviewed in the target article do not aim at self-deception but instead are the by-products of several other mechanisms: our natural tendency to self-enhance, the confirmation bias inherent in reasoning, and the lack of access to our unconscious minds.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 35
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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