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The rational imagination and other possibilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Ruth M. J. Byrne
Ruth M. J. Byrne
Affiliation:
School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland. rmbyrne@tcd.iehttp://www.tcd.ie/Psychology/Ruth_Byrne/
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Abstract

In this response I discuss some of the key issues raised by the commentators on The Rational Imagination. I consider whether the imaginative creation of alternatives to reality is rational or irrational, and what happens in childhood cognition to enable a rational imagination to develop. I outline how thoughts about causality, counterfactuality, and controllability are intertwined and why some sorts of possibilities are more readily imagined than others. I conclude with a consideration of what the counterfactual imagination is for.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 470 - 476
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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