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Neither moralists, nor scientists: We are counterfactually reasoning animals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Bence Nanay
Bence Nanay
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium; andUniversity of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1RD, United Kingdom. bence.nanay@ua.ac.behttp://webh01.ua.ac.be/bence.nanaybn206@cam.ac.uk
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Abstract

We are neither scientists nor moralists. Our mental capacities (such as attributing intentionality) are neither akin to the scientist's exact reasoning, nor are they “suffused through and through with moral considerations” (Knobe's target article, sect. 2.2, last para.). They are more similar to all those simple capacities that humans and animals are equally capable of, but with enhanced sensitivity to counterfactual situations: of what could have been.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 347 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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