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Attention, the homunculus, and the Greek theater effect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2025

Ezequiel Morsella Open the ORCID record for Ezequiel Morsella [Opens in a new window] ,
Sarah Brauer ,
Latoya Wright-Wilson  and
Tala Elsabbagh
Ezequiel Morsella*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University (SFSU) , San Francisco, California, United States morsella@sfsu.edu sbrauer@sfsu.edu lwrightwilson@sfsu.edu telsabbagh@sfsu.edu Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, California, United States
Sarah Brauer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University (SFSU) , San Francisco, California, United States morsella@sfsu.edu sbrauer@sfsu.edu lwrightwilson@sfsu.edu telsabbagh@sfsu.edu
Latoya Wright-Wilson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University (SFSU) , San Francisco, California, United States morsella@sfsu.edu sbrauer@sfsu.edu lwrightwilson@sfsu.edu telsabbagh@sfsu.edu
Tala Elsabbagh
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University (SFSU) , San Francisco, California, United States morsella@sfsu.edu sbrauer@sfsu.edu lwrightwilson@sfsu.edu telsabbagh@sfsu.edu
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

The groundbreaking, anti-homuncular view presented by the author complements conclusions from diverse areas of research, including (a) research on phenomena not concerning attention (e.g., involving anosognosia, scotomata, dreams, and consciousness) and (b) the hypothesis that attention should be construed as an effect (e.g., from the activation of priority signals and task sets) rather than as a cause.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 48 , 2025 , e151
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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