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Reasoning asymmetries do not invalidate theory-theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Karen Bartsch  and
Tess N. Young
Karen Bartsch
Affiliation:
Psychology Department 3415, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3415. bartsch@uwyo.edu tyoung14@uwyo.edu http://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/psychology/displayfaculty.asp?facultyid=1285
Tess N. Young
Affiliation:
Psychology Department 3415, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071-3415. bartsch@uwyo.edu tyoung14@uwyo.edu http://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/psychology/displayfaculty.asp?facultyid=1285
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Abstract

In this commentary we suggest that asymmetries in reasoning associated with moral judgment do not necessarily invalidate a theory-theory account of naïve psychological reasoning. The asymmetries may reflect a core knowledge assumption that human nature is prosocial, an assumption that heightens vigilance for antisocial dispositions, which in turn leads to differing assumptions about what is the presumed topic of conversation.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 331 - 332
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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