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The origins of property law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2023
Abstract
Research is increasingly suggesting that human intuitions form the core of many laws. Laws, therefore, can serve as one potential testing ground for new theories about the content and structure of intuitions. Here the model of ownership psychology as an evolved cognitive adaptation is evaluated against long-standing features of property law.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model
Related commentaries (31)
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Author response
Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences