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Morals, beliefs, and counterfactuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Vittorio Girotto ,
Luca Surian  and
Michael Siegal
Vittorio Girotto
Affiliation:
Department of Arts and Design, University IUAV of Venice, 30123 Venice, Italy, and Laboratory of Cognitive Psychology, CNRS and University of Provence, 13003 Marseilles, France. girotto.vittorio@gmail.com http://www.iuav.it/Ricerca1/Dipartimen/dADI/Docenti/girotto-vi/index.htm
Luca Surian
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Sciences and Education, Center for Mind/Brain Sciences. University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto (TN), Italy. luca.surian@unitn.it http://portale.unitn.it/cimec/persone/luca.surian
Michael Siegal
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TP, United Kingdom. m.siegal@sheffield.ac.uk http://alacode.psico.units.it/index.html
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Abstract

We have found that moral considerations interact with belief ascription in determining intentionality judgment. We attribute this finding to a differential availability of plausible counterfactual alternatives that undo the negative side-effect of an action. We conclude that Knobe's thesis does not account for processes by which counterfactuals are generated and how these processes affect moral evaluations.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 337 - 338
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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