Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-lrblm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-05T14:43:54.508Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2004

DAVID SAMUELS
DAVID SAMUELS
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

To what extent do the institutions of presidentialism allow voters to hold governments accountable? Powell and Whitten (1993) suggested that voter capacity to sanction is strong when “clarity of government responsibility” for outcomes is clear, and vice versa. I argue that clarity of responsibility functions differently under presidentialism and that presidentialism generates particular forms of accountability. In general, electoral sanctioning is weak in nonconcurrent elections, which do not occur under parliamentarism, but is stronger in concurrent elections. In concurrent executive elections the clarity of responsibility does not attenuate the economy's impact on the vote. Yet in concurrent legislative elections both partisan and institutional variables diffuse responsibility for economic performance. Thus under many common institutional and partisan formats, voters sanction presidents to a greater degree than legislators for the same phenomenon. These findings elucidate the conditions under which we might observe accountability similar to what we find in some parliamentary systems or a more uniquely presidentialist “dual democratic legitimacies” of the kind Linz (1994) imagined.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 98 , Issue 3 , August 2004 , pp. 425 - 436
Copyright
© 2004 by the American Political Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anderson Christopher. 1995. “The Dynamics of Public Support for Coalition Governments.” Comparative Political Studies 28 (Summer): 350– 83.Google Scholar
Anderson Christopher. 2000. “Economic Voting and Political Context: A Comparative Perspective.” Electoral Studies 19 (June): 151– 70.Google Scholar
Carey John M., and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank-Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14 (December): 417– 39.Google Scholar
Cheibub José Antonio, and Adam Przeworski. 1999. “Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic Outcomes.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 222– 50.
Dorussen Han, and Harvey Palmer. 2002. “The Context of Economic Voting: An Introduction.” In Economic Voting, ed. Han Dorussen and Michaell Taylor. London and New York: Routledge, 1– 14.
Elgie Robert. 1999. “The Politics of Semi-presidentialism.” In Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, ed. Robert Elgie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1– 21.
Erikson Robert S. 1989. “Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote.” American Political Science Review 83 (June): 567– 73.Google Scholar
Erikson Robert S. 1990. “Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (May): 373– 99.Google Scholar
Fiorina Morris. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Inter-American Development Bank. 2002. Democracies in Development. Washington, DC: IDB.
Lewis-Beck Michael. 1988. Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lewis-Beck Michael. 1997. “Who's the Chef? Economic Voting Under a Dual Executive.” European Journal of Political Research 31 (April): 315– 25.Google Scholar
Lewis-Beck Michael, and Mary Stegmeier. 2000. “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes.” Annual Review of Political Science 3: 183– 219.Google Scholar
Lijphart Arend. 1992. “Introduction.” In Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1– 30.
Linz Juan. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter): 51– 69.Google Scholar
Linz Juan J. 1994. “Presidential versus Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference.” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Volume 2: The Case of Latin America, ed. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 3– 90.
Manin Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes. 1999. “Elections and Representation.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 29– 54.
Nannestad Peter, and Martin Paldam. 2002. “The Cost of Ruling.” In Economic Voting, ed. Han Dorussen and Michaell Taylor. London and New York: Routledge, 17– 44.
O'Donnell Guillermo. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5 (January): 55– 69.Google Scholar
Pacek Alexander, and Benjamin Radcliff. 1995. “The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World.” American Journal of Political Science 39 (August): 745– 59.Google Scholar
Palmer Harvey D., and Guy D. Whitten. 1999. “The Electoral Impact of Unexpected Inflation and Economic Growth.” British Journal of Political Science 29 (October): 623– 39.Google Scholar
Persson Torsten, Gérard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. 1997. “Separation of Powers and Political Accountability.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (November): 1163– 203.Google Scholar
Powell G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 37 (May): 391– 414.Google Scholar
Remmer Karen L. 1991. “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s.” American Political Science Review 85 (September): 777– 800.Google Scholar
Remmer Karen L. 2001. “Elections and Economics in Contemporary Latin America.” Presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago.
Samuels David, and Matthew Shugart. 2003. “Presidentialism, Elections, and Representation.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (January): 33– 60.Google Scholar
Shugart Matthew S. 1995. “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government.” American Political Science Review 89 (June): 327– 43.Google Scholar
Shugart Matthew S., and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge.
Shugart Matthew S., and Scott Mainwaring. 1997. “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate.” In Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart. New York: Cambridge University Press, 12– 54.
Siaroff Alan. 2003. “Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distincion.” European Journal of Political Research 42: 287– 312.Google Scholar
Stokes Susan. 2001. “Introduction.” In Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies, ed. Susan C. Stokes, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1– 34.
Strøm Kaare. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge.
World Bank. 2003. “World Development Indicator.” [CD-ROM]. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.