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Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

James Johnson
James Johnson
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
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Abstract

Critical theory and rational choice theory share both overlapping concerns and parallel theoretical weaknesses. Specifically, both critical theorists and rational choice theorists are preoccupied with determining what rational can mean in the realm of social and political interaction. I show in a provisional way how game theory extends and deepens the critical theorists' basic intuition that unembellished strategic rationality cannot adequately sustain social and political interaction. And I suggest how critical theory identifies a mechanism underlying the force of the “cheap talk” that game theorists introduce in hopes of circumscribing the indeterminacy generated by their models. My goal is to stimulate productive conversation between what are typically considered discordant research traditions.

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Articles
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American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 74 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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