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General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Paul Huth  and
Bruce Russett
Paul Huth
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Bruce Russett
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Abstract

General deterrence, unlike immediate deterrence, has rarely been analyzed in a systematic comparative manner. We outline a research design for doing so, by studying the circumstances under which, in a set of enduring rivalries, challengers are likely to initiate militarized disputes. We indicate the conceptual and operational steps necessary to make and empirically compare predictions stemming from three often-competing theoretical frameworks: rational deterrence, a general model of rational conflict initiation, and a cognitive psychological model of behavior emphasizing risk orientation and misperception. The results of probit analysis on a pooled time series of enduring rivalries since 1945 provide support for hypotheses from each of the different theoretical models.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 61 - 73
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Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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