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Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Tim Groseclose ,
Steven D. Levitt  and
James M. Snyder Jr.
Tim Groseclose
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Steven D. Levitt
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
James M. Snyder Jr.
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Abstract

Interest group ratings are widely used in studies of legislative behavior. Since the set of votes used is not constant over time and across chambers, the scales underlying the scores can shift and stretch. We introduce an econometric model that corrects the problem. Specifically, we derive an index, much like an inflation index for consumer prices, that allows one to make intertemporal and interchamber comparisons of interest group ratings. The adjusted scores for the ADA show a strong liberal trend in the average member of Congress during 1947–94, followed by a conservative reversal. A nonparametric test using ADA and ACU scores demonstrates the validity of adjusted scores and the invalidity of nominal scores for intertemporal and interchamber comparisons. Using two studies (Levitt 1996; Shipan and Lowry 1997) we illustrate that the choice of adjusted versus nominal scores may greatly affect substantive conclusions of researchers.

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Type
Articles
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American Political Science Review , Volume 93 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 33 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999

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