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Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert E. Goodin
Robert E. Goodin*
Affiliation:
Australian National University
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Abstract

Many bemoan divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy. The logic of The Federalist arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the “public interest.” That quasi-Federalist logic is explored, and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals. Another and more defensible notion of the public interest is introduced, and its very different political styles, institutions, and policies are adduced.

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American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 2 , June 1996 , pp. 331 - 343
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Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

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