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A civil aviation safety assessment model using a Bayesian belief network (BBN)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2016

R. Greenberg ,
S. C. Cook  and
D. Harris
R. Greenberg
Affiliation:
Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre, University of South Australia, Mawson Lakes Campus, Adelaide, Australia
S. C. Cook
Affiliation:
Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre, University of South Australia, Mawson Lakes Campus, Adelaide, Australia
D. Harris
Affiliation:
Systems Engineering and Evaluation Centre, University of South Australia, Mawson Lakes Campus, Adelaide, Australia
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Abstract

In this paper we present a Bayesian belief network (BBN) socio-technical model for investigating the accident rate for multi-crew civil airline aircraft. The model emphasises the influence of airline policy and societal behaviour patterns on the pilots within the piloting system. The main claim of this paper is that a BBN can be used to bring most aviation safety-critical elements into a common quantitative safety assessment despite the unique problems posed by the very low probability of accidents. We support this claim by replicating certain phenomena such as the low accident rate, the difference between the ‘more’ and ‘less’ safe airlines and other statistical factors of civil aviation. In particular, the model succeeds in explaining the large gap of six to seven orders of magnitude between in-flight measurements of pilots’ error and accident rate.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Aeronautical Journal , Volume 109 , Issue 1101 , November 2005 , pp. 557 - 568
Copyright
Copyright © Royal Aeronautical Society 2005 

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