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Series:   Elements in Metaphysics

Metaontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 June 2025

Kris McDaniel
Kris McDaniel
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame

Summary

Metaontology is the branch of philosophy that focuses on questions that naturally arise when doing ontology. This Element offers the reader (some of) the elements of metaontology by way of an opinionated overview of (some of) its central arguments and positions. The first section of this Element focuses on whether there are nonexistent objects. It discusses historical figures such as Suarez, Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong, as well as contemporary figures such as Lewis, van Inwagen, Thomasson, and Zalta. The second section focuses on whether ontological questions are trivial to answer and whether ontological debates are merely verbal debates. Can there be different concepts of existence or different meanings of 'exists' or other ontological expressions? If ontological questions are nontrivial, are they nontrivial only if a substantive metaphysical view is true? Even if there aren't different senses of 'exist,' might there be different modes of being or ways to exist?
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Keywords

metaontologydeflationalismeasy ontologynonexistenceontological pluralism

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Type
Element
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Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Online ISBN: 9781009119870
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 03 July 2025

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Metaontology
  • Kris McDaniel, University of Notre Dame
  • Online ISBN: 9781009119870
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Metaontology
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  • Online ISBN: 9781009119870
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Metaontology
  • Kris McDaniel, University of Notre Dame
  • Online ISBN: 9781009119870
Available formats
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